Usama bin Ladin
As mentioned in the introduction, Usama bin Ladin’s university lector was Qutb’s brother, Muhammad Qutb. In addition, bin Ladin’s close relationship with Ayman al-Zawahiri who is very influenced by Qutb, leads one to think that Qutb’s thoughts must have been passed on to bin Ladin. So the inference made by many, is that bin Ladin (and al-Qaida) is influenced by Qutb, and this link has almost been an indispensable part of the general narrative. One could argue that this link is a construction rather than an exact description of reality. Fore instance, bin Ladin does not mention Sayyid Qutb in any of his statements, while recommending a book by Muhammad Qutb. Lawrence (2004) p. 229. Bin Ladin mentions different books and among them M. Qutb’s Concepts that Should be Corrected. What makes this strange is that while evoking authors of traditions, for example Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, bin Ladin also cites ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Taymiyya did not produce any tafsir (Qur’an commentaries) but since his works are filled with material from the Qur’an, attempts have been made to compile a tafsir: Gwynne (2006) p. 63. ibn al-Qayyim, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, al-Qurtubi, which have collected traditions, and written commentaries on the Quran, like Qutb. So if bin Ladin were some how intellectually indebted to Qutb, why not cite him? As we will see, Qutb’s interpretation of jihād is not held by bin Ladin, and this might be a possible reason for him not mentioning Qutb. Despite this fact, it will be shown that bin Ladin share some of Qutb interpretations on jāhilīyyah.
Perception of jāhilīyyah and the Ideal Society
In a video message to the Iraqi people in October of 2003, bin Ladin urged the Iraqis not to support the occupation by the United States. In this message bin Ladin denounce democracy as a religion of ignorance; “Islam is the religion of God, and the legislative councils of representatives are the religion of ignorance [i.e. jāhilīyyah].” Lawrence (2004) p. 208. He also stressed the importance of not supporting solutions or roadmaps for peace which involve apostate regimes or the Jews and Crusaders, for peace with these would be an “errant idea which contravenes God’s law and stands in the way of fighting for him.” Ibid. p. 208. According to bin Ladin (likewise Qutb and al-Zawahiri), all laws emanate from God. On the opposite side of tawhīd is shirk (polytheism). Now, tawhīd (essentially monotheism) is the essence of the first pillar of Islam (shahāda). As mentioned earlier, to obey a law, means per definition to obey and to worship its makers. So for bin Ladin, the thought of having a legislative branch as per democratic systems is unthinkable because it contradicts the very essence of tawhīd, and thus constitutes shirk. Democracy, because it is based on human desires, also endorses specific behaviours like desire, same-sex marriage or partnership, gender equality, freedom of speech, secularism, usury, corruption etc. Bin Ladin’s ideal society is one that is ruled according to the will of God, by way of the sharia laws. The democratic and secular system known throughout the West, is not his cup of the. If the Islamic movement would take over the Arabian Peninsula, the countries would be run as per the revelation of the Prophet Muhammad and the will of God. Ibid. p. 45. In addition, bin Ladin also seeks to restore the caliphate and to make the umma the victor over falsehood and inequality in the Arab countries:
[O]ur concern is that our umma unites either under the Words of the Book of God or his Prophet […], and that this nation should establish the righteous caliphate [kilāfah al-rāshid-ān] which has been prophesised by our Prophet in his authentic hadith. Ibid. p. 121.
The righteous or pious caliphates refer to the four successors of the Prophet Muhammad. They are regarded as righteous because they were fulfilling the deeds of the Prophet, thus their reign was based on a religious authority. After the death of Ali, who was the last of the four, Islam was divided and there have been many different caliphates since then, none of which were religiously rooted, but rather based on power politics. In other words, “the spirit of Islamic democracy was buried in the coffin of Ali […].” Noorani (2002) p. 79.
In short, there are similarities between bin Ladin and Qutb. Both describe democracy and its features as a religion of jāhilīyyah. They also share the notion that obedience is worshipping, and thereby making obedience of man-made laws an act of great sin, shirk. Bin Ladin’s idea of an ideal society also seems to be in accord with that of Qutb. One difference is that bin Ladin explicitly advocates the forming of a caliphate, while the word caliphate does not occur in Milestones. However, Qutb do argue that if Islam was to lead the world, it would have to base its societal structure on the first umma.
Perception of jihād
For Usama bin Ladin, jihād is an indispensable part of Islamic religiosity. It could be viewed as a sixth pillar of Islam, and is seen as a religious responsibility:
I say it jihad is without doubt mandatory for all Muslims, to free al-Aqsa, or to save the weak in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and all Islamic lands; there is no doubt that freeing the Arabian peninsula from the polytheists [al-mushrakīn] is also compulsory. Lawrence (2004) p. 115.
The jihad has become an obligation upon each and every Muslim. We advise the Muslim youth not to fall victim to the words of some ulema who are misleading the umma by stating that jihad is still a communal duty [as in an Offensive jihad]. Ibrahim (2007) p. 268. [bracket by Ibrahim]
The above citation and especially the latter part of it, i.e. the mentioning of an offensive jihād, calls for an explanation. The defensive jihad is an individual duty according to bin Ladin, while the offensive jihad is a communal duty. A common notion is that the offensive jihād cannot commanded by anyone but the Caliph, which is a non-existent position. The Caliph could, much like any other head of state, take its nation to war and would therefore have the authority to issue a draft which would make it a communal duty to serve. For this reason, jihād to conquer new lands for Islam could not legitimately take place as long as there is no caliph who could authorize it. But as Esposito points out, the interpretation of jihād as offensive came from the time of early Islam when the umma was sponsored financially by the caliphate, which made it dependent of the latter. The caliphate needed religious legitimacy to enable it to expand. It is in this context one should understand the development of the notion or the dogma of offensive jihād. Esposito (2003) p. 35. Bin Ladin calls for jihād in defence of Islam and the umma, which he argues to be mandatory for all Muslims. This form does not need an authorization as the one above. The notion of al-Qaida’s war as defensive jihād has been challenged though. For example, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Muhammad Said Tantawy: Lawrence (2004) p. 141. For bin Ladin, jihād in the context of pre- and post-9/11 is defensive in nature. Whether this means that he does not acknowledge the notion of offensive jihād, is hard to say. In examining his rhetoric we find that jihād is almost exclusively being used in a defensive sense. There is one text, though, that speaks of Islam as an offensive religion and of jihād as a tool to enforce Islam on people. Although very interesting, this essay does not take this text into consideration due to the uncertainty about its authorship. The text, “Moderate Islam is a Prostration to the West”, is purportedly written or authorized by bin Ladin. It argues for example that “They say that our sharia does not impose our particular belief upon others; this is a false assertion. For it is, in fact, part of our religion to impose our particular beliefs upon others.” Ibrahim (2007) p.51. Regarding the defensive message of bin Ladin and possible reasons for its perseverance; one take is that he needs to formulate an argument so that it coincides with the thoughts of the ulema and Islamic law. Some argue that the formulation of a defensive jihād and that it is being provoked by attacks on Islam, gives proof of his genius. Scheuer (2004) p. 7. Another interpretation is that his proclamation of a defensive jihād is genuine and honest; he feels as if his religion, society and fellow Muslims, and the Islamic way of life are being attacked. Thus, his call for jihād could be interpreted as nothing more than a respond to this attack. The defensive message was quite harshly delivered in the World Islamic Front’s declaration of war against the Jews and the Crusaders, 1998:
To kill the American[s] and there allies - civilians and military – is an individual duty incumbent upon every Muslim […] in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque [i.e. al-Haram in Mecca] so that their armies leave all territory of Islam […] unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of God Almighty: ‘Fight the idolaters at any time, if they first fight you […] until there is no more persecution […]. Lawrence (2004) p. 61.
In an interview with the Pakistani Daily, on November 7 2001, bin Ladin stated that the fight against the USA is defensive in nature:
We ourselves [the Muslims] are the victims of murder and massacres. We are only defending ourselves against the United States. This is a defensive jihad to protect our land and people. That’s why I have said that if we don’t have security, neither will the Americans. It’s a very simple equation […]. Ibid. p. 141. [italics added]
The earlier messages of bin Ladin focused on Saudi Arabia its policies towards the Middle East, and their alliance with the United States. By letting US forces use Saudi soil to launch its war against Iraq in the first Gulf War, they had stained the holy sanctities of Islam. In addition, the regime had stolen the income of the people to spend it on its joys. This amongst other things, led bin Ladin to openly declare war on America and on the Saudi regime for suspending the sharia and replacing it with man-made laws; and for being unable to protect the land, and thus depending on “the American Crusaders, who have become the principal reason for all aspects of our land’s disastrous predicament.” Ibid. p. 28. To further grasp bin Ladin’s conception of jihād, it is also vital to know under which circumstances it might end:
The cause of the reaction must be sought and the act that triggered this reaction must be eliminated. The reaction came as a result of the aggressive US policy towards the entire Muslim world […]. So if the cause that has called for this act comes to an end, this act, in turn, will come to an end. So, the defensive jihad against the US does not stop with its withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula; rather, it must desist from aggressive intervention against Muslims throughout the whole world. Ibid. p. 47-48. [italics added]
The struggle would end it is said, with the ending of foreign intervention in the Muslim world. This is essential because his call for defensive jihād would not else have worked, logically. Bin Ladin has also stated that the perpetrators of the attacks on Washington and New York, had committed the acts in “self-defense, [in] defence of our brothers and sons in Palestine, and in order to free our holy sanctuaries”. Further more he seems to be arguing against describing these acts as terrorism; “And if inciting for these reasons is terrorism, and if killing those that kill our sons is terrorism, then let history witness that we are terrorists.” Ibid. p. 107. Both citations. In other words, al-Qaida are not terrorists in the original sense, but rather more like insurgents. In February 2003 (a month prior to the invasion of Iraq) an audiotape was aired by al-Jazeera. In it bin Ladin urged the people of Iraq to engage in a defensive jihād against the forthcoming invaders. Ibid. p. 181.
All these American crimes and sins are a clear proclamation of war against God, his Messenger, and the Muslims. Religious scholars throughout Islamic history have agreed that jihad is an individual duty when an enemy attacks Muslim countries. […] ‘After faith, there is no greater duty than fighting an enemy who is corrupting religion and the world’. Ibid. p. 60-61. [italics added]
Defending Islam and Muslims is only obligatory if it is possible to do. In an interview with al-Jazeera December 1998, bin Ladin explained that jihād should be carried out if the necessary conditions exists, but, “[h]owever, in some countries it might have been shown to some people that the necessary conditions are in place, but after a while they gain experience [and] realise that this is in fact not the case; in this instance they are charged with pardon and forgiveness.” Ibid. p. 79. There are also other sides of jihād as per bin Ladin. He quotes the hadith
Of Sahih Muslim, which says: “Whoever fights them [the infidels] with his hand is a believer, whoever does so with his tongue is a believer, whoever does so with his heart is a believer”. Ibid. p. 202. Thus, fighting is not the only way of pursuing jihād. The ones who are unable to fight, must wage jihād through speaking or by finance. The one’s who cannot speak or who do not have any money to spare should perform jihād with their hearts. Bin Ladin argues that the mujāhid should perform jihād “both with his hand and tongue, although this is only the weakest part of faith.” Ibid. p. 202. It is not clear what bin Ladin is referring to here. This could be a reference to the notion of the greater and lesser jihād. Bin Ladin quotes ibn Taymiyya saying “there is no greater duty after faith than uncompromising struggle [i.e. jihād] against [the enemy of Islam].” Ibid. p. 202. This seems to indicate that faith is ascribed a higher value than physical jihād.
To summarize, jihād as per bin Ladin departs from Qutb’s interpretation of the same. Bin Ladin uses jihād in a defensive sense, which stands in contrast with Qutb’s argument which says that jihād is only offensive.
References:
Books Books that do not have any printing location are e-books.
Abdo, Geneive (2002) No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam. OUP.
Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Mansouri, Fethi (2007) Islam and Political Violence. Tauris Academic Studies.
Azzam, Sheik Abdullah, Join the Caravan, English translation in pdf.
Cook, David (2005) Understanding Jihad. University of California Press.
Cooper, Barry (2004) New Political Religions, or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism. University of Missouri Press.
Davis, Joyce M. (2003) Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan
Esposito, John L. (2003) Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. NY, OUP.
Esposito, John L. (2005) Islam. The Straight Path. NY, OUP, 3rd ed.
Euben, Roxanne L. (1999) Enemy in the Mirror. Princeton University Press.
Gold, Dore (2003) Hatred’s Kingdom. How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism. D.C., Regnery Publishing, Inc.
Habeck, Mary (2006) Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror. Yale, Yale University Press.
Hamdi, Hassan A. (2004), Al-Qaeda: The Background of the Pursuit for Global Jihad, Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksell International.
Ibrahim, Raymond (2007) The Al Qaeda Reader. NY, Broadway Books.
Kenney, Jeffrey T. (2006) Muslim Rebels: Kharijite Rhetoric and the Politics of Extremism in Modern Egypt. Oxford University Press.
Kepel, Gilles (2004) The War for Muslim Minds. Islam and the West. Cambridge, The Belknap Press of HUP.
Kepel, Gilles (1984/2003) Muslim Extremism in Egypt. The Prophet and the Pharaoh. California, UCP.
Lapidus, Ira M. (2002) A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge, CUP, 2nd ed.
Lawrence, Bruce [ed.] (2005) Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden. NY, Verso.
Mansfield, Laura (2006) His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri. USA, Lulu, TLG Publications. (Includes Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner)
Ménoret, Pascal (2005) The Saudi Enigma. A History. London, Zed Books.
Noorani, A. G. (2002) Islam & Jihad. Prejudice versus Reality. London, Zed Books Ltd.
Pape, Robert A. (2006) Dying To Win. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. NY, Random House Trade Paperbacks.
Qutb, Sayyid (2001) Milestones. New Delhi, Islamic Book Service.
Qutb, Sayyid (1973) Signposts Along the Way. Beirut/ Cairo, Dar al-Shurūq.
Arabic: سيد قطب (١٩٧٣)"معالم فى الطريق"..بيروت،القاهرة ..طبعة : دار الشروق
Can be downloaded in pdf [http://www.mediafire.com/?tkh4wjcqzli]
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2002), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, D.C., Brassey’s, first edition.
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2004), Imperial Hubris- Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror, Dulles, Virginia, Brassey’s, first edition.
Timmerman, Kenneth R. (2004) Preachers of Hate. Islam and the War on America, NY, Three Rivers Press.
Wehr, Hans (1994) The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. 4th ed.
Wright, Lawrence (2007), The Looming Tower- Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New York, Vintage Books.
Al-Zawahiri, Ayman (2001) Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. (Originally published on a website منبر التوحيد والجهاد / minbar al-tawhid wa al-jihad, English: “pulpit of monotheism and jihad”.
Zeidan, David (2003) Resurgence of Religion: A Comparative Study of Selected Themes in Christian and Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses. Brill, N.H.E.J., N.V. Koninklijke, Boekhandel en Drukkerij
Articles
Cragin, Kim R, (2008) “Early History of Al-Qa’ida”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, No. 4.
Evans, Alexander (2007) “The Man and the Message: The World According To Bin Laden”, Asian Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. II, Routledge.
Gwynne, Rosalind W. (2006)”Usama bin Ladin, the Qur’an and Jihad”, Religion, Vol. 36.
Hansen, Hendrik & Kainz, Peter (2007) “Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: a Comparison of Sayyid Qutb’s Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 8, No. 1.
Shepard, William (1997) “The Myth of Progress in the Writings of Sayyid Qutb”, Religion, Vol. 27.
As mentioned in the introduction, Usama bin Ladin’s university lector was Qutb’s brother, Muhammad Qutb. In addition, bin Ladin’s close relationship with Ayman al-Zawahiri who is very influenced by Qutb, leads one to think that Qutb’s thoughts must have been passed on to bin Ladin. So the inference made by many, is that bin Ladin (and al-Qaida) is influenced by Qutb, and this link has almost been an indispensable part of the general narrative. One could argue that this link is a construction rather than an exact description of reality. Fore instance, bin Ladin does not mention Sayyid Qutb in any of his statements, while recommending a book by Muhammad Qutb. Lawrence (2004) p. 229. Bin Ladin mentions different books and among them M. Qutb’s Concepts that Should be Corrected. What makes this strange is that while evoking authors of traditions, for example Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, bin Ladin also cites ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Taymiyya did not produce any tafsir (Qur’an commentaries) but since his works are filled with material from the Qur’an, attempts have been made to compile a tafsir: Gwynne (2006) p. 63. ibn al-Qayyim, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, al-Qurtubi, which have collected traditions, and written commentaries on the Quran, like Qutb. So if bin Ladin were some how intellectually indebted to Qutb, why not cite him? As we will see, Qutb’s interpretation of jihād is not held by bin Ladin, and this might be a possible reason for him not mentioning Qutb. Despite this fact, it will be shown that bin Ladin share some of Qutb interpretations on jāhilīyyah.
Perception of jāhilīyyah and the Ideal Society
In a video message to the Iraqi people in October of 2003, bin Ladin urged the Iraqis not to support the occupation by the United States. In this message bin Ladin denounce democracy as a religion of ignorance; “Islam is the religion of God, and the legislative councils of representatives are the religion of ignorance [i.e. jāhilīyyah].” Lawrence (2004) p. 208. He also stressed the importance of not supporting solutions or roadmaps for peace which involve apostate regimes or the Jews and Crusaders, for peace with these would be an “errant idea which contravenes God’s law and stands in the way of fighting for him.” Ibid. p. 208. According to bin Ladin (likewise Qutb and al-Zawahiri), all laws emanate from God. On the opposite side of tawhīd is shirk (polytheism). Now, tawhīd (essentially monotheism) is the essence of the first pillar of Islam (shahāda). As mentioned earlier, to obey a law, means per definition to obey and to worship its makers. So for bin Ladin, the thought of having a legislative branch as per democratic systems is unthinkable because it contradicts the very essence of tawhīd, and thus constitutes shirk. Democracy, because it is based on human desires, also endorses specific behaviours like desire, same-sex marriage or partnership, gender equality, freedom of speech, secularism, usury, corruption etc. Bin Ladin’s ideal society is one that is ruled according to the will of God, by way of the sharia laws. The democratic and secular system known throughout the West, is not his cup of the. If the Islamic movement would take over the Arabian Peninsula, the countries would be run as per the revelation of the Prophet Muhammad and the will of God. Ibid. p. 45. In addition, bin Ladin also seeks to restore the caliphate and to make the umma the victor over falsehood and inequality in the Arab countries:
[O]ur concern is that our umma unites either under the Words of the Book of God or his Prophet […], and that this nation should establish the righteous caliphate [kilāfah al-rāshid-ān] which has been prophesised by our Prophet in his authentic hadith. Ibid. p. 121.
The righteous or pious caliphates refer to the four successors of the Prophet Muhammad. They are regarded as righteous because they were fulfilling the deeds of the Prophet, thus their reign was based on a religious authority. After the death of Ali, who was the last of the four, Islam was divided and there have been many different caliphates since then, none of which were religiously rooted, but rather based on power politics. In other words, “the spirit of Islamic democracy was buried in the coffin of Ali […].” Noorani (2002) p. 79.
In short, there are similarities between bin Ladin and Qutb. Both describe democracy and its features as a religion of jāhilīyyah. They also share the notion that obedience is worshipping, and thereby making obedience of man-made laws an act of great sin, shirk. Bin Ladin’s idea of an ideal society also seems to be in accord with that of Qutb. One difference is that bin Ladin explicitly advocates the forming of a caliphate, while the word caliphate does not occur in Milestones. However, Qutb do argue that if Islam was to lead the world, it would have to base its societal structure on the first umma.
Perception of jihād
For Usama bin Ladin, jihād is an indispensable part of Islamic religiosity. It could be viewed as a sixth pillar of Islam, and is seen as a religious responsibility:
I say it jihad is without doubt mandatory for all Muslims, to free al-Aqsa, or to save the weak in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and all Islamic lands; there is no doubt that freeing the Arabian peninsula from the polytheists [al-mushrakīn] is also compulsory. Lawrence (2004) p. 115.
The jihad has become an obligation upon each and every Muslim. We advise the Muslim youth not to fall victim to the words of some ulema who are misleading the umma by stating that jihad is still a communal duty [as in an Offensive jihad]. Ibrahim (2007) p. 268. [bracket by Ibrahim]
The above citation and especially the latter part of it, i.e. the mentioning of an offensive jihād, calls for an explanation. The defensive jihad is an individual duty according to bin Ladin, while the offensive jihad is a communal duty. A common notion is that the offensive jihād cannot commanded by anyone but the Caliph, which is a non-existent position. The Caliph could, much like any other head of state, take its nation to war and would therefore have the authority to issue a draft which would make it a communal duty to serve. For this reason, jihād to conquer new lands for Islam could not legitimately take place as long as there is no caliph who could authorize it. But as Esposito points out, the interpretation of jihād as offensive came from the time of early Islam when the umma was sponsored financially by the caliphate, which made it dependent of the latter. The caliphate needed religious legitimacy to enable it to expand. It is in this context one should understand the development of the notion or the dogma of offensive jihād. Esposito (2003) p. 35. Bin Ladin calls for jihād in defence of Islam and the umma, which he argues to be mandatory for all Muslims. This form does not need an authorization as the one above. The notion of al-Qaida’s war as defensive jihād has been challenged though. For example, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Muhammad Said Tantawy: Lawrence (2004) p. 141. For bin Ladin, jihād in the context of pre- and post-9/11 is defensive in nature. Whether this means that he does not acknowledge the notion of offensive jihād, is hard to say. In examining his rhetoric we find that jihād is almost exclusively being used in a defensive sense. There is one text, though, that speaks of Islam as an offensive religion and of jihād as a tool to enforce Islam on people. Although very interesting, this essay does not take this text into consideration due to the uncertainty about its authorship. The text, “Moderate Islam is a Prostration to the West”, is purportedly written or authorized by bin Ladin. It argues for example that “They say that our sharia does not impose our particular belief upon others; this is a false assertion. For it is, in fact, part of our religion to impose our particular beliefs upon others.” Ibrahim (2007) p.51. Regarding the defensive message of bin Ladin and possible reasons for its perseverance; one take is that he needs to formulate an argument so that it coincides with the thoughts of the ulema and Islamic law. Some argue that the formulation of a defensive jihād and that it is being provoked by attacks on Islam, gives proof of his genius. Scheuer (2004) p. 7. Another interpretation is that his proclamation of a defensive jihād is genuine and honest; he feels as if his religion, society and fellow Muslims, and the Islamic way of life are being attacked. Thus, his call for jihād could be interpreted as nothing more than a respond to this attack. The defensive message was quite harshly delivered in the World Islamic Front’s declaration of war against the Jews and the Crusaders, 1998:
To kill the American[s] and there allies - civilians and military – is an individual duty incumbent upon every Muslim […] in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque [i.e. al-Haram in Mecca] so that their armies leave all territory of Islam […] unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of God Almighty: ‘Fight the idolaters at any time, if they first fight you […] until there is no more persecution […]. Lawrence (2004) p. 61.
In an interview with the Pakistani Daily, on November 7 2001, bin Ladin stated that the fight against the USA is defensive in nature:
We ourselves [the Muslims] are the victims of murder and massacres. We are only defending ourselves against the United States. This is a defensive jihad to protect our land and people. That’s why I have said that if we don’t have security, neither will the Americans. It’s a very simple equation […]. Ibid. p. 141. [italics added]
The earlier messages of bin Ladin focused on Saudi Arabia its policies towards the Middle East, and their alliance with the United States. By letting US forces use Saudi soil to launch its war against Iraq in the first Gulf War, they had stained the holy sanctities of Islam. In addition, the regime had stolen the income of the people to spend it on its joys. This amongst other things, led bin Ladin to openly declare war on America and on the Saudi regime for suspending the sharia and replacing it with man-made laws; and for being unable to protect the land, and thus depending on “the American Crusaders, who have become the principal reason for all aspects of our land’s disastrous predicament.” Ibid. p. 28. To further grasp bin Ladin’s conception of jihād, it is also vital to know under which circumstances it might end:
The cause of the reaction must be sought and the act that triggered this reaction must be eliminated. The reaction came as a result of the aggressive US policy towards the entire Muslim world […]. So if the cause that has called for this act comes to an end, this act, in turn, will come to an end. So, the defensive jihad against the US does not stop with its withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula; rather, it must desist from aggressive intervention against Muslims throughout the whole world. Ibid. p. 47-48. [italics added]
The struggle would end it is said, with the ending of foreign intervention in the Muslim world. This is essential because his call for defensive jihād would not else have worked, logically. Bin Ladin has also stated that the perpetrators of the attacks on Washington and New York, had committed the acts in “self-defense, [in] defence of our brothers and sons in Palestine, and in order to free our holy sanctuaries”. Further more he seems to be arguing against describing these acts as terrorism; “And if inciting for these reasons is terrorism, and if killing those that kill our sons is terrorism, then let history witness that we are terrorists.” Ibid. p. 107. Both citations. In other words, al-Qaida are not terrorists in the original sense, but rather more like insurgents. In February 2003 (a month prior to the invasion of Iraq) an audiotape was aired by al-Jazeera. In it bin Ladin urged the people of Iraq to engage in a defensive jihād against the forthcoming invaders. Ibid. p. 181.
All these American crimes and sins are a clear proclamation of war against God, his Messenger, and the Muslims. Religious scholars throughout Islamic history have agreed that jihad is an individual duty when an enemy attacks Muslim countries. […] ‘After faith, there is no greater duty than fighting an enemy who is corrupting religion and the world’. Ibid. p. 60-61. [italics added]
Defending Islam and Muslims is only obligatory if it is possible to do. In an interview with al-Jazeera December 1998, bin Ladin explained that jihād should be carried out if the necessary conditions exists, but, “[h]owever, in some countries it might have been shown to some people that the necessary conditions are in place, but after a while they gain experience [and] realise that this is in fact not the case; in this instance they are charged with pardon and forgiveness.” Ibid. p. 79. There are also other sides of jihād as per bin Ladin. He quotes the hadith
Of Sahih Muslim, which says: “Whoever fights them [the infidels] with his hand is a believer, whoever does so with his tongue is a believer, whoever does so with his heart is a believer”. Ibid. p. 202. Thus, fighting is not the only way of pursuing jihād. The ones who are unable to fight, must wage jihād through speaking or by finance. The one’s who cannot speak or who do not have any money to spare should perform jihād with their hearts. Bin Ladin argues that the mujāhid should perform jihād “both with his hand and tongue, although this is only the weakest part of faith.” Ibid. p. 202. It is not clear what bin Ladin is referring to here. This could be a reference to the notion of the greater and lesser jihād. Bin Ladin quotes ibn Taymiyya saying “there is no greater duty after faith than uncompromising struggle [i.e. jihād] against [the enemy of Islam].” Ibid. p. 202. This seems to indicate that faith is ascribed a higher value than physical jihād.
To summarize, jihād as per bin Ladin departs from Qutb’s interpretation of the same. Bin Ladin uses jihād in a defensive sense, which stands in contrast with Qutb’s argument which says that jihād is only offensive.
References:
Books Books that do not have any printing location are e-books.
Abdo, Geneive (2002) No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam. OUP.
Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Mansouri, Fethi (2007) Islam and Political Violence. Tauris Academic Studies.
Azzam, Sheik Abdullah, Join the Caravan, English translation in pdf.
Cook, David (2005) Understanding Jihad. University of California Press.
Cooper, Barry (2004) New Political Religions, or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism. University of Missouri Press.
Davis, Joyce M. (2003) Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan
Esposito, John L. (2003) Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. NY, OUP.
Esposito, John L. (2005) Islam. The Straight Path. NY, OUP, 3rd ed.
Euben, Roxanne L. (1999) Enemy in the Mirror. Princeton University Press.
Gold, Dore (2003) Hatred’s Kingdom. How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism. D.C., Regnery Publishing, Inc.
Habeck, Mary (2006) Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror. Yale, Yale University Press.
Hamdi, Hassan A. (2004), Al-Qaeda: The Background of the Pursuit for Global Jihad, Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksell International.
Ibrahim, Raymond (2007) The Al Qaeda Reader. NY, Broadway Books.
Kenney, Jeffrey T. (2006) Muslim Rebels: Kharijite Rhetoric and the Politics of Extremism in Modern Egypt. Oxford University Press.
Kepel, Gilles (2004) The War for Muslim Minds. Islam and the West. Cambridge, The Belknap Press of HUP.
Kepel, Gilles (1984/2003) Muslim Extremism in Egypt. The Prophet and the Pharaoh. California, UCP.
Lapidus, Ira M. (2002) A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge, CUP, 2nd ed.
Lawrence, Bruce [ed.] (2005) Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden. NY, Verso.
Mansfield, Laura (2006) His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri. USA, Lulu, TLG Publications. (Includes Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner)
Ménoret, Pascal (2005) The Saudi Enigma. A History. London, Zed Books.
Noorani, A. G. (2002) Islam & Jihad. Prejudice versus Reality. London, Zed Books Ltd.
Pape, Robert A. (2006) Dying To Win. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. NY, Random House Trade Paperbacks.
Qutb, Sayyid (2001) Milestones. New Delhi, Islamic Book Service.
Qutb, Sayyid (1973) Signposts Along the Way. Beirut/ Cairo, Dar al-Shurūq.
Arabic: سيد قطب (١٩٧٣)"معالم فى الطريق"..بيروت،القاهرة ..طبعة : دار الشروق
Can be downloaded in pdf [http://www.mediafire.com/?tkh4wjcqzli]
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2002), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, D.C., Brassey’s, first edition.
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2004), Imperial Hubris- Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror, Dulles, Virginia, Brassey’s, first edition.
Timmerman, Kenneth R. (2004) Preachers of Hate. Islam and the War on America, NY, Three Rivers Press.
Wehr, Hans (1994) The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. 4th ed.
Wright, Lawrence (2007), The Looming Tower- Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New York, Vintage Books.
Al-Zawahiri, Ayman (2001) Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. (Originally published on a website منبر التوحيد والجهاد / minbar al-tawhid wa al-jihad, English: “pulpit of monotheism and jihad”.
Zeidan, David (2003) Resurgence of Religion: A Comparative Study of Selected Themes in Christian and Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses. Brill, N.H.E.J., N.V. Koninklijke, Boekhandel en Drukkerij
Articles
Cragin, Kim R, (2008) “Early History of Al-Qa’ida”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, No. 4.
Evans, Alexander (2007) “The Man and the Message: The World According To Bin Laden”, Asian Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. II, Routledge.
Gwynne, Rosalind W. (2006)”Usama bin Ladin, the Qur’an and Jihad”, Religion, Vol. 36.
Hansen, Hendrik & Kainz, Peter (2007) “Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: a Comparison of Sayyid Qutb’s Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 8, No. 1.
Shepard, William (1997) “The Myth of Progress in the Writings of Sayyid Qutb”, Religion, Vol. 27.
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