Conclusion and Discussion
This essay’s aim has been to show in what ways Sayyid Qutb’s ideas are reflected in the rhetoric of Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The concepts in focus have been jāhilīyyah and jihād. In addition, the aim has been to provide a sketch for their thoughts on the ideal society. In comparing these three items, many similarities have been found, but also differences. While this research does not try to make inferences about why certain differences and similarities might be, it will be discussed in this section as we go along.
We begin with some similarities. Qutb, bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri define jāhilīyyah in a similar fashion, i.e. a state of ignorance of Islam. They also use the term to separate Islam from what is not Islam. All three define democracy and its features as a religion of jāhilīyyah. The reason for this description is because it is a man-made system that advocates qualities which contradicts Islam. In this system, leaders, laws are followed and therefore worshipped by the people (to obey, is to worship). Hence, the concept of tawhīd is replaced by shirk, because man, not God is made the sovereign legislator, instigator of morals and values etc. Man is de facto a god. While the perception of jāhilīyyah is the same among the three, however, they do part concerning how it ought to be dealt with. Qutb wants to eradicate jāhilīyyah worldwide by the means of jihād. This goal is shared by neither bin Ladin nor al-Zawahiri. By contrast, they exclusively use jāhilīyyah to describe what does not constitute Islam. They do not mention anything about going out of their ways to remove it from the globe, but solely the Muslim world. They make use of the term in their propaganda against their foes, i.e. the regimes in the Muslim world and its Western supporters. These states have allied themselves with democratic states of the West, and have been influenced by the Western way of thinking, life, and culture at the expense of Islam. Their main goal is to rid the Muslim world of Western influence and what they perceive as an occupation of its sanctities.
Their call for jihād is a defensive call, not an offensive one. This represents a fundamental difference. For one, Qutb clearly states that the notion of jihād as defensive is false and simply erroneous. Islam is an offensive religion, its aim being to bring people worldwide, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, back to their sustainer and thus freeing them from serving others than God. In fact, the new Islamic religion as in the days of Muhammad could be seen as an attempt to bring people back to the straight path to God, which people in those days had deviated from. For Qutb however, jihād can only be defensive if it thereby means in defence of humankind against jāhilīyyah. His stand on defensive jihād also becomes apparent in his interpretation of the struggle against the oppression of Muslims in the early days of Islam. He argues that this struggle was fought for the sake of Islam (not the oppressed), during a passing period after which the real goal of Islam could be pursued. Essentially, it is the duty of all Muslims to fight jāhilīyyah today because it has a chokehold on Islam, and ultimately by fighting it, Muslims will make Islam the dominant religion.
Unlike Qutb, bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri do not seem to have this agenda, as far as their rhetoric indicates. They do regard jihād as a religious duty (fard ‘ain) and they speak with a lot of emotion about how it is every Muslims duty to defend their suffering Muslim kind in for example Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya etc. This can be done either by fighting, financing, discourse or simply by hating the enemy. This struggle will be needed as long as there is aggression against Muslims and their lands.
Both bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri speak of re-establishing the righteous caliphate and al-Zawahiri even gives suggestions of where it could be based. The idea of a caliphate is not explicitly mentioned in Milestones. Evenly so, Qutb do touch the subject when he talks about the first umma as a role model for the ideal society, which would be necessary to have if Islam would to assume the role of the leadership of mankind. This suggests that he is not against the thought of having someone leading the umma, like the Prophet did (but who would lead the umma of today?). For al-Zawahiri, the caliphate plays an important role. It is pivotal for the struggle against infidel and oppressive regimes to establish a caliphate in the midst of the Middle East, simply because it would give the jihadist movements a country to plan and launch their operations from, which is probably easier than doing it from a cave in the Himalayas. But this strategy as per al-Zawahiri’s statements etc. is confined to the Middle East. Nowhere does he or bin Ladin mention that their struggle is against world atheism, but rather Middle Eastern atheism. The emirate that would precede the caliphate would be lead by a shura council. If a caliphate saw the light they could spread their brand of Islam to the neighbouring countries, and freeing them from oppression.
Concerning Qutb’s influence on bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri’s rhetoric. As seen, one of the most important concepts of Qutb is jāhilīyyah. This concept, although not first used by Qutb in a modern context but Mawdudi, has made a deep impact on the Muslim extremists, making them see the regimes of the Middle East in a new way, and instigating jihād against world jāhilīyyah. Essentially they are all in some sense intellectually indebted to Qutb, either directly or by proxy (i.e. through other authors who have used Qutb’s ideas). Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri are probably quite familiar to these ideas. Al-Zawahiri quotes Qutb in his statements and works and could be considered directly influenced, while bin Ladin only mentions Muhammad Qutb, which was his lector. This does not mean that bin Ladin is unfamiliar with the work of Sayyid Qutb. On the contrary, it is likely that he read Qutb during his years in the University, and perhaps through al-Zawahiri. In addition, the works of Sayyid Qutb is quite popular in Arabic countries and it is therefore plausible to infer that bin Ladin could have gotten his share of Qutbism that way.
The most interesting finding of this study is the different interpretations of jihād. These discrepancies indicates that bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri are not indebted to Qutb in this regard, except perhaps for the use of force against anti-Islamic elements. It also seems reasonable to think that they have been more influenced by people like Abdullah Azzam, who also had more of a defensive message than Qutb had, and whom they had worked together with in Peshawar. In any case, the difference concerning the perception of jihād is so fundamental that it is quite phenomenal that none of the sources used for this essay have picked it up. Fundamental, since it deals with the real nature of Islam, its true meaning and purpose.
This essay’s aim has been to show in what ways Sayyid Qutb’s ideas are reflected in the rhetoric of Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The concepts in focus have been jāhilīyyah and jihād. In addition, the aim has been to provide a sketch for their thoughts on the ideal society. In comparing these three items, many similarities have been found, but also differences. While this research does not try to make inferences about why certain differences and similarities might be, it will be discussed in this section as we go along.
We begin with some similarities. Qutb, bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri define jāhilīyyah in a similar fashion, i.e. a state of ignorance of Islam. They also use the term to separate Islam from what is not Islam. All three define democracy and its features as a religion of jāhilīyyah. The reason for this description is because it is a man-made system that advocates qualities which contradicts Islam. In this system, leaders, laws are followed and therefore worshipped by the people (to obey, is to worship). Hence, the concept of tawhīd is replaced by shirk, because man, not God is made the sovereign legislator, instigator of morals and values etc. Man is de facto a god. While the perception of jāhilīyyah is the same among the three, however, they do part concerning how it ought to be dealt with. Qutb wants to eradicate jāhilīyyah worldwide by the means of jihād. This goal is shared by neither bin Ladin nor al-Zawahiri. By contrast, they exclusively use jāhilīyyah to describe what does not constitute Islam. They do not mention anything about going out of their ways to remove it from the globe, but solely the Muslim world. They make use of the term in their propaganda against their foes, i.e. the regimes in the Muslim world and its Western supporters. These states have allied themselves with democratic states of the West, and have been influenced by the Western way of thinking, life, and culture at the expense of Islam. Their main goal is to rid the Muslim world of Western influence and what they perceive as an occupation of its sanctities.
Their call for jihād is a defensive call, not an offensive one. This represents a fundamental difference. For one, Qutb clearly states that the notion of jihād as defensive is false and simply erroneous. Islam is an offensive religion, its aim being to bring people worldwide, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, back to their sustainer and thus freeing them from serving others than God. In fact, the new Islamic religion as in the days of Muhammad could be seen as an attempt to bring people back to the straight path to God, which people in those days had deviated from. For Qutb however, jihād can only be defensive if it thereby means in defence of humankind against jāhilīyyah. His stand on defensive jihād also becomes apparent in his interpretation of the struggle against the oppression of Muslims in the early days of Islam. He argues that this struggle was fought for the sake of Islam (not the oppressed), during a passing period after which the real goal of Islam could be pursued. Essentially, it is the duty of all Muslims to fight jāhilīyyah today because it has a chokehold on Islam, and ultimately by fighting it, Muslims will make Islam the dominant religion.
Unlike Qutb, bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri do not seem to have this agenda, as far as their rhetoric indicates. They do regard jihād as a religious duty (fard ‘ain) and they speak with a lot of emotion about how it is every Muslims duty to defend their suffering Muslim kind in for example Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya etc. This can be done either by fighting, financing, discourse or simply by hating the enemy. This struggle will be needed as long as there is aggression against Muslims and their lands.
Both bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri speak of re-establishing the righteous caliphate and al-Zawahiri even gives suggestions of where it could be based. The idea of a caliphate is not explicitly mentioned in Milestones. Evenly so, Qutb do touch the subject when he talks about the first umma as a role model for the ideal society, which would be necessary to have if Islam would to assume the role of the leadership of mankind. This suggests that he is not against the thought of having someone leading the umma, like the Prophet did (but who would lead the umma of today?). For al-Zawahiri, the caliphate plays an important role. It is pivotal for the struggle against infidel and oppressive regimes to establish a caliphate in the midst of the Middle East, simply because it would give the jihadist movements a country to plan and launch their operations from, which is probably easier than doing it from a cave in the Himalayas. But this strategy as per al-Zawahiri’s statements etc. is confined to the Middle East. Nowhere does he or bin Ladin mention that their struggle is against world atheism, but rather Middle Eastern atheism. The emirate that would precede the caliphate would be lead by a shura council. If a caliphate saw the light they could spread their brand of Islam to the neighbouring countries, and freeing them from oppression.
Concerning Qutb’s influence on bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri’s rhetoric. As seen, one of the most important concepts of Qutb is jāhilīyyah. This concept, although not first used by Qutb in a modern context but Mawdudi, has made a deep impact on the Muslim extremists, making them see the regimes of the Middle East in a new way, and instigating jihād against world jāhilīyyah. Essentially they are all in some sense intellectually indebted to Qutb, either directly or by proxy (i.e. through other authors who have used Qutb’s ideas). Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri are probably quite familiar to these ideas. Al-Zawahiri quotes Qutb in his statements and works and could be considered directly influenced, while bin Ladin only mentions Muhammad Qutb, which was his lector. This does not mean that bin Ladin is unfamiliar with the work of Sayyid Qutb. On the contrary, it is likely that he read Qutb during his years in the University, and perhaps through al-Zawahiri. In addition, the works of Sayyid Qutb is quite popular in Arabic countries and it is therefore plausible to infer that bin Ladin could have gotten his share of Qutbism that way.
The most interesting finding of this study is the different interpretations of jihād. These discrepancies indicates that bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri are not indebted to Qutb in this regard, except perhaps for the use of force against anti-Islamic elements. It also seems reasonable to think that they have been more influenced by people like Abdullah Azzam, who also had more of a defensive message than Qutb had, and whom they had worked together with in Peshawar. In any case, the difference concerning the perception of jihād is so fundamental that it is quite phenomenal that none of the sources used for this essay have picked it up. Fundamental, since it deals with the real nature of Islam, its true meaning and purpose.
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