Sayyid Qutb
Milestones Literally: signposts along/in the way/road or path, (ma´ālim fī al-tarīq).
In the foreword to the 2001 edition of Milestones we read the following:
It seems that true Islamic principles are too much for the corrupt regimes of the self-proclaimed leaders of so-called Islamic countries. The ultimate price for working too please God Almighty and to propagate his ways in this world is often one’s own life. [Qutb] tried to do it; he paid for it with his life. If you and I try to do it, there is every likelihood we will be call upon to do the same. But for those who truly believe in God, what other choice is there? Qutb (2001/2008). “Forward”. It is not clear who has written this. A suggestion is that it is authored by the publisher, Abdul Naeem.
In the above fashion, the reader of Milestones recognises the message of martyrdom which is outlined in the book and by the circumstances around Qutb’s own departure from life. The call for the ultimate self-sacrifice of martyrdom can not be ignored by the readers, and for many radicals and ordinary Egyptians he was killed for speaking truth to power. Cook (2005) p. 103; and Davis (2003) p. 117. During his incarcerations, Qutb suffered from severe and lengthy torture, so severe that he had two heart attacks. Euben (1999) p. 60. He was accused for conspiring to overthrow the regime, was tried and found guilty and sentenced to death. Milestones served as vital evidence during that trial. Shepard (1997) p. 258. Even to own a copy of the book was (and still is?) considered an offence in Egypt: Esposito (2003) p. 58. Despite this ban the book is widely read by students, for whom Milestones is seen as a symbol of resistance: Abdo (2002) p. 13. As a response to the verdict, Egyptians demonstrated against the court’s decision. Nasser sent Sadat to try and convince Qutb to appeal the verdict, and if he had chosen to do so, his life would be spared. Qutb rejected the proposition and later told his sister, who had challenged her brother’s decision, that “my words will be stronger if they kill me.” Wright (2007) p. 36. In this way, the book sort of became Qutb’s last testament. Cook (2005) p. 106; and Hedin (2001) p. 159. This ‘testament’ was written for a future Muslim vanguard, whose aim would be to implement the ideas of the book, i.e. the re-establishment of God’s rule on the basis of the Quran, and the dissolving of jāhilīyyah throughout the world. In a true revivalist fashion, he acknowledged that the world had drifted away from God and fallen into a state of jāhilīyyah. The revivalist, Muhammad ibn ´Abd al-Wahhab, also felt that the 18th century Arabian Peninsula and its societies were in a state of jāhilīyyah, due to worship of idols: Esposito (2005) p. 118; and Lapidus (2002) p. 572. In his book, kitāb al-tawhīd, al-Wahhab called for jihad, meaning both inner struggle and war: Ménoret (2005) p. 45. Thus, it is the future vanguard’s mission to revitalize Islam and to spread it to non-Muslims with jihād. To accomplish this it would have to know “the landmarks and the milestones of the road toward this goal so that they may recognize the starting place, the nature, the responsibilities and the ultimate purpose of this long journey.” Qutb (2001/2008) p. 12.
Perception of jāhilīyyah and the Ideal Society
One of the key points in Milestones is the notion that the world has fallen into a state of jāhilīyyah. As mentioned earlier, the term refers to the historical state of ignorance of God which preceded the new religion of Islam on the Arabian Peninsula. Qutb defines the term as a state or condition that is not limited to any given point in history; “Ignorance [jāhilīyyah] is not limited to any particular age, but is a condition which reappears whenever people deviate from the way of Islam.” Ibid. p. 144. So what can be considered jāhilīyyah? Qutb’s perception of the term can be shown in the following:
The jahili society is any society other than the Muslim society; and if we want a more specific definition, we may say that any society is a jahili society which does not dedicate itself to submission to God alone, in its beliefs and ideas in its observances of worship, and in its legal regulations. According to this definition, all the societies existing in the world today are jahili. Ibid. p. 80-81.
Noteworthy is the length of which he takes his argument, that is, all the societies existing in the world today are jahili, which also includes Muslim states. Accordingly, none of them organize life in accordance with the Sharia. Further more, the gap between man and God has deepened due to the modern society and its materialistic, technical and scientific achievements. In medieval Europe, the dichotomy science – religion “deprived the empirical sciences of their Islamic method of relating them to God's guidance.”: Qutb (2001/2008) p. 112. Modern day jāhilīyyah has gone much deeper than the state prior to Islam, because man now creates his own laws and values, and has thus become his own ruler and sovereign and left God on the side bench. Mankind has rebelled against God, for sovereignty is an attribute of God, not man. According to Qutb, the Prophet Muhammad made it clear that “obedience to laws and judgements” is worship. Ibid. p. 60. When men obey laws they at the same time worship them. Thus, by following man-made laws people also submit to its legislators, and therefore making “some men […] lords over others”, which is incompatible with Islam. Ibid. p. 60. The same logic is applied to values, customs and so on. Elevating man to the same level as God is shirk, i.e. to acknowledge other gods besides God, which is the opposite of tawhīd (the oneness of God). Communism, imperialism, democracy, and capitalism are causes of the non existent appliance of the canonical Sharia. These systems, in fact, all jahili-systems oppress, humiliate, exploitate, and deny “the dignity of man given to him by God.” Ibid. p. 11. These societies also diminish the immorality of “illegitimate sexual relationships [e.g. extramarital affairs], [and] even homosexuality”, Qutb contends. Ibid. p. 98.
Accordingly, there are Muslim societies and non-Muslim societies. The Muslim societies are based upon the submission to the will and rule of God (i.e. in accordance with the Sharia Ibid. p. 58.), while the non-Muslim societies are founded on the will of man, egocentric desires, which in turn is reflected in the economic and religious features of jahili-systems. Islam’s purpose is to “abolish all such concepts, laws, customs and traditions, and to replace them with a new concept of human life.” Ibid. p. 131. This form of human life is based on Islamic law, and not to man-made concepts. Qutb also argues that these societies, e.g. the United States, are full of immoralities and contradictions. He also recognises that the hegemonic status of the West is on the decline because it has lost its values and that “even the Western world realises that Western civilization is unable to present any healthy values for the guidance of mankind.” Ibid. p. 7. The world needs a new leadership, and Islam is the only system that can assume this responsibility, because the Islamic way of life, and thus its values and ideals, are in symbiosis with human nature. Ibid. p. 8. Another reason is that affiliation to Islam is not based on race, nationality, tribe or family relationships, but rather on faith. Ibid. p. 123-125. Islam surpasses or stands over these affiliations that are jahili-groupings, and is thus universal:
This religion is not merely a declaration of the freedom of the Arabs, nor is its message confined to the Arabs. It addresses itself to the whole of mankind, and its sphere of work is the whole earth. God is the Sustainer not merely of the Arabs, nor is His providence limited to those who believe in the faith of Islam. God is the Sustainer of the whole world. This religion wants to bring back the whole world to its Sustainer and free it from servitude to anyone other than God. Ibid. p. 59-60
In essence, Qutb’s ideal society would be based around a model of the first umma, if Islam was “to play the role of the leader of mankind.” Ibid. p. 9. The ideal society would be based on Sharia laws.
Perception of jihād
Islam does not force people to accept its belief, but it wants to provide a free environment in which they will have the choice of beliefs. Ibid. p. 57.
Islam is to rid the world of jahili obstacles by force, and only when these have been removed can people chose to accept or reject Islam as their religion. Ibid. p. 56 and 72. Jihād means striving for making the Islamic “system of life dominant in the world.” Ibid. p. 76. It also differs from the modern warfare in terms of its objectives, causes. Jihād corresponds with religious aims and is not motivated by non-Religious aims: “The reasons for Jihaad [are] to establish God’s authority [on] earth; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man over others […].” Ibid. p. 70. Qutb also stress that there is no compulsion in religion. When the Islamic movement (the Vanguard) has removed the jahili obstacles and the society is ruled by the sharia, then “no one will be forced to change his beliefs and accept Islam.” Ibid. p. 70. Qutb summarizes the method of Islam in two parts. Firstly, Islam does not limit itself to preaching and argumentation to remove power. Secondly, at the same time it does not aim to change people’s beliefs. Accordingly, the ones who are seeking freedom from the oppression of men are welcomed to serve God instead. This point is demonstrated by the following sentences:
Islam provides a legal basis for the relationship of the Muslim community with other groups […]. This legal formulation is based on the principle that Islam - that is, submission to God-is a universal Message which the whole of mankind should accept or make peace with. No political system or material power should put hindrances in the way of preaching Islam. It should leave every individual free to accept or reject it, and if someone wants to accept it, it should not prevent him or fight against him. If someone does this, then it is the duty of Islam to fight him until either he is killed or until he declares his submission. Ibid. p. 57. [italics added]
Islam is not only a religion, but also a way of life. The notion of Islam being voluntary should be viewed in the context of Islam being more than just a religion. Put in this way, a contradiction is avoided, for else how could Islam be non-compulsory while at the same time non-Muslims (dhimmīs) would have to acknowledge and respect Muslim authority as per sharia laws? People under Muslim rule would not be forced to convert, but to accept the authority of the former by taxation, jizah, and by keeping their pledge they would be protected.
As previously stated, jāhilīyyah is a state or condition that the world has fallen into. Now, if we view jāhilīyyah as a form of disease, then jihād is its cure. Qutb describes the different stages of jihād. According to this narrative (which is inspired by scholar ibn Qayyim’s zad al-mi’ad), Muhammad was first chosen by God to be his prophet, and later to ‘rise and warn’, first his relatives, the Arabs, and then the world, about life without Islam and Judgement Day. Muhammad practiced restraint and patience against the non-believers, and tried to persuade them through preaching God’s word. Then he was told to fight. At first the Muslims were restrained from fighting in Mecca. One reason was that Muhammad could speak freely because the Banu Hashim clan protected him against the Quraysh, and thus there were no reason to fight. Ibid. p. 67. During the migration (al-hijrah) in 622 to Medina the Muslims were instructed to establish prayers and to pay zakāh and not to engage in any fighting, but to establish a community of believers (umma). Esposito (2005) p. 13. Before migrating Muhammad had been invited to Medina (in those days called Yathrib) to serve as the arbitrator (hakam) of a dispute between the tribes there. Ibid. p. 8. In time the umma in Medina became the dominant actor, and which led to creation of a charter or constitution of Medina, which stated the rights and duties of all citizens, and the relationship between non-Muslims and the umma. Ibid. p. 9. For instance, it stipulated that every conflict or disagreement be brought before the arbiter Muhammad. Lapidus (2002) p. 23. During the same period, it also became apparent to the Prophet that Islam was to become a religion which would not encompass Christians or Jews, and thus Jerusalem was replaced by Mecca as the direction of prayer (qibla). The Muslims staying in Mecca and other parts of the Arabian Peninsula were under his leadership. Thus, their concerns were his concerns. In this sense there was no Muslim homeland, due to the fact that Islamic affiliation was based upon faith and not soil. During this time, Medina was in a state of war with Mecca. The Muslims got permission to fight because they were oppressed:
God held back Muslims from fighting in Mecca and in the early period of their migration to Medina, and told them, ‘Restrain your hands, and establish regular prayers, and pay Zakat’. Next, they were permitted to fight: ‘Permission to fight is given to those against whom war is made, because they are oppressed, and God is able to help them. These are the people who were expelled from their homes without cause. The next stage came when the Muslims were commanded to fight those who fight them: ‘Fight in the cause of God against those who fight you.’ And finally, war was declared against all the polytheists [al-mushrikīn ]: ‘And fight [biqitāl] against all the polytheists, as they all fight against you;’ ‘Fight against those among the People of the Book who do not believe in God and the Last Day, who do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden, and who do not consider the true religion as their religion, until they are subdued and pay Jizyah [tax for the dhimma]. Qutb (2001/2008) p. 64.
The struggle against oppression is not to be interpreted as a defence for Muslims but rather for the sake of Islam, according to Qutb. Thus, there are no motives of self-interest (such as greed, personal gain etc.) which would cause a Muslim to pick up arms. The defensive feature is only a passing thing which does not constitute the main aim. Before a Muslim goes to war he has already “fought a great battle within himself against […] his own desires and ambitions, his personal interests and inclinations, the interests of his family and of his nation; against which is not from Islam.” Ibid. p. 71. This shows jihād as an inner struggle.
So far, Qutb seems to be arguing for jihād to be waged through preaching first, and then by means of force. As previously indicated and as the following will show, jihād (and Islam per se) should on the contrary, be understood as an offensive movement. The idea that many of Qutb’s contemporary Muslim scholars and muftis putted forward, that jihād in regards of warfare or violence, could only be sanctioned if it were for the purpose of defending Muslims, is wrong according to Qutb:
Anyone who understands this particular character of this religion will also understand the place for jihaad bis saif (striving through fighting), which is to clear the way for striving through preaching […]. He will understand that Islam is not a ‘defensive movement’ in the narrow sense which today is technically called a ‘defensive war’ [harb difā´iyah]. This narrow meaning is ascribed to it by who are […] defeated by the wily attacks of the orientalists, who distort the concept of Islamic Jihaad. Ibid. p. 61-62. [italics added]
Thus, jihād precedes preaching, which axiomatically could not be possible without the former. To call jihād a defensive movement, the concept of defence would need to be broaden. Proponents of this narrow definition are simply mistaken when it comes to the true nature of jihād. Throughout history jihād has been waged in defence of Muslim countries. Qutb contends that what seems to have been restraint from use of force, was indeed necessary since the Muslims in Mecca were a minority and would have been defeated if they had tried to enforce Islam upon people. They were thus instructed not to fight, but to preach instead. The goal still remained the same throughout the period, i.e. the domination of Islam. Qutb argues that the notions of Islam’s defensive nature are the products of Orientalism. Defensive jihād can only mean the defense of mankind and its liberation from jāhiliyyah:
If we insist on calling Islamic Jihaad a defensive movement, than we must change the meaning of the word ‘defense’ and mean by it ‘the defense of man’ against all those elements which limit his freedom [i.e. beliefs, concepts, and political systems based on economics, race and class distinctions. Basically jahiliyyah-systems or elements]. Ibid. p. 62.
Muslim fighters do not fight in defence of their homelands, but to invite people to Islam and free them of servitude of man, and to bring into the servitude of God, in other words, “from the tyranny of religions into the justice of Islam.” Ibid. p. 71.. This endeavour would not work through the use of argument and discourse ethics alone. It would also require the use of force:
It would be naïve to assume that a call is raised to free the whole world of humankind throughout the earth, and it is confined to preaching and exposition. Indeed, it strives through preaching and exposition when there is freedom of communication and when people are free from all these influences, as ‘There is no compulsion in religion’; but when the abovementioned obstacles and practical difficulties [i.e. elements of jāhiliyyah], are put in its [i.e. Islam’s] way, it has no recourse but to remove them by force so that when it is addressed to peoples’ hearts and minds they are free to accept or reject it with an open mind. Ibid. p. 63. [italics added]
Accordingly, jāhilīyyah makes people unable to accept Islam as their religion. Therefore all the jahili obstacles would have to be gone to enable people to see the true religion and that becoming Muslim is the best way to organise their lives. Thus, preaching cannot eradicate world jāhilīyyah on its own. More importantly, the above citations suggest that Qutb’s ideas have a wider scope than Egypt or the other countries in the Middle East; his idea of jihād encompasses the world. Here we need to stop and evaluate. So far Qutb is encouraging jihād to rid the world of jāhilīyyah, for only then could people be susceptible to Islam. This reading of Qutb’s argument does clash with these words from Milestones:
This [task of removing jāhilīyyah] cannot come about by going along a few steps with Jahiliyyah, nor by now severing relations with it and removing ourselves [the Muslims] to a separate corner; never. The correct procedure is to mix with discretion, give and take with dignity, speak the truth with love, and show the superiority of the Faith with humility. After all this, we must realize the fact that we live in the midst of Jahiliyyah, that our way of life is straighter than that of Jahiliyyah, and that the change from Jahiliyyah to Islam is vast and far-reaching. The chasm between Islam and Jahiliyyah is great, and a bridge is not to be built across it so that the people on the two sides may mix with each other, but only so that the people of Jahiliyyah may come over to Islam, whether they reside in a so-called Islamic country and consider themselves Muslims or they are outside the 'Islamic' country, in order that they may come out of darkness into light and may get rid of their miserable condition, and enjoy those blessings which we have tasted-we who have understood Islam and live in its atmosphere. If not, then we shall say to them what God commanded His Messenger -peace be on him-to say:
‘For you your way, for me mine.’ (109:6) Ibid. p. 140. [italics added]
This statement leaves room for interpretation, especially because of Qutb’s quotation of the Quran, for you your way (meaning faith), and for me mine. This gives the impression that Islam should not be coerced upon anyone, which seemingly contradicts the idea of the eradication of jāhilīyyah by force. At the same time, as we have learned earlier, Qutb argues that Islam is more than a religion; it covers all societal needs. As such, Islam could be seen as a political system which is based on the Sharia. As in any nation-state, people living in it would have to live according to its laws. In this perspective, the non-Muslims residing in Muslim countries (and Muslims living in Christian countries) would have to follow Islamic law but without being forced to give up their own faith and beliefs, and thus there would be freedom of religion. Although, the violent aspect of jihād (as per Qutb) cannot easily be waved off, nor ignored. It could be interpreted as in the example of the Prophet, that in a world full of jāhilīyyah, it may at first be wise to restrain from fighting, to wait until the time is right to do so, i.e. to clear the way for striving through preaching. Some have interpreted Qutb’s jihād as meaning both an armed and an intellectual struggle. Habeck (2006) p.36 Essentially, due to the ambiguity of Qutb’s text, there is support for several readings. The reading that will be advocated here, though, is that Qutb contends that jihād is an armed (as well as an intellectual) struggle to eradicate jāhilīyyah worldwide. First by armed struggle against its jahili leadership, and then through preaching and debate.
References:
Books Books that do not have any printing location are e-books.
Abdo, Geneive (2002) No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam. OUP.
Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Mansouri, Fethi (2007) Islam and Political Violence. Tauris Academic Studies.
Azzam, Sheik Abdullah, Join the Caravan, English translation in pdf.
Cook, David (2005) Understanding Jihad. University of California Press.
Cooper, Barry (2004) New Political Religions, or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism. University of Missouri Press.
Davis, Joyce M. (2003) Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan
Esposito, John L. (2003) Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. NY, OUP.
Esposito, John L. (2005) Islam. The Straight Path. NY, OUP, 3rd ed.
Euben, Roxanne L. (1999) Enemy in the Mirror. Princeton University Press.
Gold, Dore (2003) Hatred’s Kingdom. How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism. D.C., Regnery Publishing, Inc.
Habeck, Mary (2006) Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror. Yale, Yale University Press.
Hamdi, Hassan A. (2004), Al-Qaeda: The Background of the Pursuit for Global Jihad, Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksell International.
Ibrahim, Raymond (2007) The Al Qaeda Reader. NY, Broadway Books.
Kenney, Jeffrey T. (2006) Muslim Rebels: Kharijite Rhetoric and the Politics of Extremism in Modern Egypt. Oxford University Press.
Kepel, Gilles (2004) The War for Muslim Minds. Islam and the West. Cambridge, The Belknap Press of HUP.
Kepel, Gilles (1984/2003) Muslim Extremism in Egypt. The Prophet and the Pharaoh. California, UCP.
Lapidus, Ira M. (2002) A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge, CUP, 2nd ed.
Lawrence, Bruce [ed.] (2005) Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden. NY, Verso.
Mansfield, Laura (2006) His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri. USA, Lulu, TLG Publications. (Includes Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner)
Ménoret, Pascal (2005) The Saudi Enigma. A History. London, Zed Books.
Noorani, A. G. (2002) Islam & Jihad. Prejudice versus Reality. London, Zed Books Ltd.
Pape, Robert A. (2006) Dying To Win. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. NY, Random House Trade Paperbacks.
Qutb, Sayyid (2001) Milestones. New Delhi, Islamic Book Service.
Qutb, Sayyid (1973) Signposts Along the Way. Beirut/ Cairo, Dar al-Shurūq.
Arabic: سيد قطب (١٩٧٣)"معالم فى الطريق"..بيروت،القاهرة ..طبعة : دار الشروق
Can be downloaded in pdf [http://www.mediafire.com/?tkh4wjcqzli]
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2002), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, D.C., Brassey’s, first edition.
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2004), Imperial Hubris- Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror, Dulles, Virginia, Brassey’s, first edition.
Timmerman, Kenneth R. (2004) Preachers of Hate. Islam and the War on America, NY, Three Rivers Press.
Wehr, Hans (1994) The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. 4th ed.
Wright, Lawrence (2007), The Looming Tower- Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New York, Vintage Books.
Al-Zawahiri, Ayman (2001) Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. (Originally published on a website منبر التوحيد والجهاد / minbar al-tawhid wa al-jihad, English: “pulpit of monotheism and jihad”.
Zeidan, David (2003) Resurgence of Religion: A Comparative Study of Selected Themes in Christian and Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses. Brill, N.H.E.J., N.V. Koninklijke, Boekhandel en Drukkerij
Articles
Cragin, Kim R, (2008) “Early History of Al-Qa’ida”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, No. 4.
Evans, Alexander (2007) “The Man and the Message: The World According To Bin Laden”, Asian Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. II, Routledge.
Gwynne, Rosalind W. (2006)”Usama bin Ladin, the Qur’an and Jihad”, Religion, Vol. 36.
Hansen, Hendrik & Kainz, Peter (2007) “Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: a Comparison of Sayyid Qutb’s Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 8, No. 1.
Shepard, William (1997) “The Myth of Progress in the Writings of Sayyid Qutb”, Religion, Vol. 27.
Milestones Literally: signposts along/in the way/road or path, (ma´ālim fī al-tarīq).
In the foreword to the 2001 edition of Milestones we read the following:
It seems that true Islamic principles are too much for the corrupt regimes of the self-proclaimed leaders of so-called Islamic countries. The ultimate price for working too please God Almighty and to propagate his ways in this world is often one’s own life. [Qutb] tried to do it; he paid for it with his life. If you and I try to do it, there is every likelihood we will be call upon to do the same. But for those who truly believe in God, what other choice is there? Qutb (2001/2008). “Forward”. It is not clear who has written this. A suggestion is that it is authored by the publisher, Abdul Naeem.
In the above fashion, the reader of Milestones recognises the message of martyrdom which is outlined in the book and by the circumstances around Qutb’s own departure from life. The call for the ultimate self-sacrifice of martyrdom can not be ignored by the readers, and for many radicals and ordinary Egyptians he was killed for speaking truth to power. Cook (2005) p. 103; and Davis (2003) p. 117. During his incarcerations, Qutb suffered from severe and lengthy torture, so severe that he had two heart attacks. Euben (1999) p. 60. He was accused for conspiring to overthrow the regime, was tried and found guilty and sentenced to death. Milestones served as vital evidence during that trial. Shepard (1997) p. 258. Even to own a copy of the book was (and still is?) considered an offence in Egypt: Esposito (2003) p. 58. Despite this ban the book is widely read by students, for whom Milestones is seen as a symbol of resistance: Abdo (2002) p. 13. As a response to the verdict, Egyptians demonstrated against the court’s decision. Nasser sent Sadat to try and convince Qutb to appeal the verdict, and if he had chosen to do so, his life would be spared. Qutb rejected the proposition and later told his sister, who had challenged her brother’s decision, that “my words will be stronger if they kill me.” Wright (2007) p. 36. In this way, the book sort of became Qutb’s last testament. Cook (2005) p. 106; and Hedin (2001) p. 159. This ‘testament’ was written for a future Muslim vanguard, whose aim would be to implement the ideas of the book, i.e. the re-establishment of God’s rule on the basis of the Quran, and the dissolving of jāhilīyyah throughout the world. In a true revivalist fashion, he acknowledged that the world had drifted away from God and fallen into a state of jāhilīyyah. The revivalist, Muhammad ibn ´Abd al-Wahhab, also felt that the 18th century Arabian Peninsula and its societies were in a state of jāhilīyyah, due to worship of idols: Esposito (2005) p. 118; and Lapidus (2002) p. 572. In his book, kitāb al-tawhīd, al-Wahhab called for jihad, meaning both inner struggle and war: Ménoret (2005) p. 45. Thus, it is the future vanguard’s mission to revitalize Islam and to spread it to non-Muslims with jihād. To accomplish this it would have to know “the landmarks and the milestones of the road toward this goal so that they may recognize the starting place, the nature, the responsibilities and the ultimate purpose of this long journey.” Qutb (2001/2008) p. 12.
Perception of jāhilīyyah and the Ideal Society
One of the key points in Milestones is the notion that the world has fallen into a state of jāhilīyyah. As mentioned earlier, the term refers to the historical state of ignorance of God which preceded the new religion of Islam on the Arabian Peninsula. Qutb defines the term as a state or condition that is not limited to any given point in history; “Ignorance [jāhilīyyah] is not limited to any particular age, but is a condition which reappears whenever people deviate from the way of Islam.” Ibid. p. 144. So what can be considered jāhilīyyah? Qutb’s perception of the term can be shown in the following:
The jahili society is any society other than the Muslim society; and if we want a more specific definition, we may say that any society is a jahili society which does not dedicate itself to submission to God alone, in its beliefs and ideas in its observances of worship, and in its legal regulations. According to this definition, all the societies existing in the world today are jahili. Ibid. p. 80-81.
Noteworthy is the length of which he takes his argument, that is, all the societies existing in the world today are jahili, which also includes Muslim states. Accordingly, none of them organize life in accordance with the Sharia. Further more, the gap between man and God has deepened due to the modern society and its materialistic, technical and scientific achievements. In medieval Europe, the dichotomy science – religion “deprived the empirical sciences of their Islamic method of relating them to God's guidance.”: Qutb (2001/2008) p. 112. Modern day jāhilīyyah has gone much deeper than the state prior to Islam, because man now creates his own laws and values, and has thus become his own ruler and sovereign and left God on the side bench. Mankind has rebelled against God, for sovereignty is an attribute of God, not man. According to Qutb, the Prophet Muhammad made it clear that “obedience to laws and judgements” is worship. Ibid. p. 60. When men obey laws they at the same time worship them. Thus, by following man-made laws people also submit to its legislators, and therefore making “some men […] lords over others”, which is incompatible with Islam. Ibid. p. 60. The same logic is applied to values, customs and so on. Elevating man to the same level as God is shirk, i.e. to acknowledge other gods besides God, which is the opposite of tawhīd (the oneness of God). Communism, imperialism, democracy, and capitalism are causes of the non existent appliance of the canonical Sharia. These systems, in fact, all jahili-systems oppress, humiliate, exploitate, and deny “the dignity of man given to him by God.” Ibid. p. 11. These societies also diminish the immorality of “illegitimate sexual relationships [e.g. extramarital affairs], [and] even homosexuality”, Qutb contends. Ibid. p. 98.
Accordingly, there are Muslim societies and non-Muslim societies. The Muslim societies are based upon the submission to the will and rule of God (i.e. in accordance with the Sharia Ibid. p. 58.), while the non-Muslim societies are founded on the will of man, egocentric desires, which in turn is reflected in the economic and religious features of jahili-systems. Islam’s purpose is to “abolish all such concepts, laws, customs and traditions, and to replace them with a new concept of human life.” Ibid. p. 131. This form of human life is based on Islamic law, and not to man-made concepts. Qutb also argues that these societies, e.g. the United States, are full of immoralities and contradictions. He also recognises that the hegemonic status of the West is on the decline because it has lost its values and that “even the Western world realises that Western civilization is unable to present any healthy values for the guidance of mankind.” Ibid. p. 7. The world needs a new leadership, and Islam is the only system that can assume this responsibility, because the Islamic way of life, and thus its values and ideals, are in symbiosis with human nature. Ibid. p. 8. Another reason is that affiliation to Islam is not based on race, nationality, tribe or family relationships, but rather on faith. Ibid. p. 123-125. Islam surpasses or stands over these affiliations that are jahili-groupings, and is thus universal:
This religion is not merely a declaration of the freedom of the Arabs, nor is its message confined to the Arabs. It addresses itself to the whole of mankind, and its sphere of work is the whole earth. God is the Sustainer not merely of the Arabs, nor is His providence limited to those who believe in the faith of Islam. God is the Sustainer of the whole world. This religion wants to bring back the whole world to its Sustainer and free it from servitude to anyone other than God. Ibid. p. 59-60
In essence, Qutb’s ideal society would be based around a model of the first umma, if Islam was “to play the role of the leader of mankind.” Ibid. p. 9. The ideal society would be based on Sharia laws.
Perception of jihād
Islam does not force people to accept its belief, but it wants to provide a free environment in which they will have the choice of beliefs. Ibid. p. 57.
Islam is to rid the world of jahili obstacles by force, and only when these have been removed can people chose to accept or reject Islam as their religion. Ibid. p. 56 and 72. Jihād means striving for making the Islamic “system of life dominant in the world.” Ibid. p. 76. It also differs from the modern warfare in terms of its objectives, causes. Jihād corresponds with religious aims and is not motivated by non-Religious aims: “The reasons for Jihaad [are] to establish God’s authority [on] earth; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man over others […].” Ibid. p. 70. Qutb also stress that there is no compulsion in religion. When the Islamic movement (the Vanguard) has removed the jahili obstacles and the society is ruled by the sharia, then “no one will be forced to change his beliefs and accept Islam.” Ibid. p. 70. Qutb summarizes the method of Islam in two parts. Firstly, Islam does not limit itself to preaching and argumentation to remove power. Secondly, at the same time it does not aim to change people’s beliefs. Accordingly, the ones who are seeking freedom from the oppression of men are welcomed to serve God instead. This point is demonstrated by the following sentences:
Islam provides a legal basis for the relationship of the Muslim community with other groups […]. This legal formulation is based on the principle that Islam - that is, submission to God-is a universal Message which the whole of mankind should accept or make peace with. No political system or material power should put hindrances in the way of preaching Islam. It should leave every individual free to accept or reject it, and if someone wants to accept it, it should not prevent him or fight against him. If someone does this, then it is the duty of Islam to fight him until either he is killed or until he declares his submission. Ibid. p. 57. [italics added]
Islam is not only a religion, but also a way of life. The notion of Islam being voluntary should be viewed in the context of Islam being more than just a religion. Put in this way, a contradiction is avoided, for else how could Islam be non-compulsory while at the same time non-Muslims (dhimmīs) would have to acknowledge and respect Muslim authority as per sharia laws? People under Muslim rule would not be forced to convert, but to accept the authority of the former by taxation, jizah, and by keeping their pledge they would be protected.
As previously stated, jāhilīyyah is a state or condition that the world has fallen into. Now, if we view jāhilīyyah as a form of disease, then jihād is its cure. Qutb describes the different stages of jihād. According to this narrative (which is inspired by scholar ibn Qayyim’s zad al-mi’ad), Muhammad was first chosen by God to be his prophet, and later to ‘rise and warn’, first his relatives, the Arabs, and then the world, about life without Islam and Judgement Day. Muhammad practiced restraint and patience against the non-believers, and tried to persuade them through preaching God’s word. Then he was told to fight. At first the Muslims were restrained from fighting in Mecca. One reason was that Muhammad could speak freely because the Banu Hashim clan protected him against the Quraysh, and thus there were no reason to fight. Ibid. p. 67. During the migration (al-hijrah) in 622 to Medina the Muslims were instructed to establish prayers and to pay zakāh and not to engage in any fighting, but to establish a community of believers (umma). Esposito (2005) p. 13. Before migrating Muhammad had been invited to Medina (in those days called Yathrib) to serve as the arbitrator (hakam) of a dispute between the tribes there. Ibid. p. 8. In time the umma in Medina became the dominant actor, and which led to creation of a charter or constitution of Medina, which stated the rights and duties of all citizens, and the relationship between non-Muslims and the umma. Ibid. p. 9. For instance, it stipulated that every conflict or disagreement be brought before the arbiter Muhammad. Lapidus (2002) p. 23. During the same period, it also became apparent to the Prophet that Islam was to become a religion which would not encompass Christians or Jews, and thus Jerusalem was replaced by Mecca as the direction of prayer (qibla). The Muslims staying in Mecca and other parts of the Arabian Peninsula were under his leadership. Thus, their concerns were his concerns. In this sense there was no Muslim homeland, due to the fact that Islamic affiliation was based upon faith and not soil. During this time, Medina was in a state of war with Mecca. The Muslims got permission to fight because they were oppressed:
God held back Muslims from fighting in Mecca and in the early period of their migration to Medina, and told them, ‘Restrain your hands, and establish regular prayers, and pay Zakat’. Next, they were permitted to fight: ‘Permission to fight is given to those against whom war is made, because they are oppressed, and God is able to help them. These are the people who were expelled from their homes without cause. The next stage came when the Muslims were commanded to fight those who fight them: ‘Fight in the cause of God against those who fight you.’ And finally, war was declared against all the polytheists [al-mushrikīn ]: ‘And fight [biqitāl] against all the polytheists, as they all fight against you;’ ‘Fight against those among the People of the Book who do not believe in God and the Last Day, who do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden, and who do not consider the true religion as their religion, until they are subdued and pay Jizyah [tax for the dhimma]. Qutb (2001/2008) p. 64.
The struggle against oppression is not to be interpreted as a defence for Muslims but rather for the sake of Islam, according to Qutb. Thus, there are no motives of self-interest (such as greed, personal gain etc.) which would cause a Muslim to pick up arms. The defensive feature is only a passing thing which does not constitute the main aim. Before a Muslim goes to war he has already “fought a great battle within himself against […] his own desires and ambitions, his personal interests and inclinations, the interests of his family and of his nation; against which is not from Islam.” Ibid. p. 71. This shows jihād as an inner struggle.
So far, Qutb seems to be arguing for jihād to be waged through preaching first, and then by means of force. As previously indicated and as the following will show, jihād (and Islam per se) should on the contrary, be understood as an offensive movement. The idea that many of Qutb’s contemporary Muslim scholars and muftis putted forward, that jihād in regards of warfare or violence, could only be sanctioned if it were for the purpose of defending Muslims, is wrong according to Qutb:
Anyone who understands this particular character of this religion will also understand the place for jihaad bis saif (striving through fighting), which is to clear the way for striving through preaching […]. He will understand that Islam is not a ‘defensive movement’ in the narrow sense which today is technically called a ‘defensive war’ [harb difā´iyah]. This narrow meaning is ascribed to it by who are […] defeated by the wily attacks of the orientalists, who distort the concept of Islamic Jihaad. Ibid. p. 61-62. [italics added]
Thus, jihād precedes preaching, which axiomatically could not be possible without the former. To call jihād a defensive movement, the concept of defence would need to be broaden. Proponents of this narrow definition are simply mistaken when it comes to the true nature of jihād. Throughout history jihād has been waged in defence of Muslim countries. Qutb contends that what seems to have been restraint from use of force, was indeed necessary since the Muslims in Mecca were a minority and would have been defeated if they had tried to enforce Islam upon people. They were thus instructed not to fight, but to preach instead. The goal still remained the same throughout the period, i.e. the domination of Islam. Qutb argues that the notions of Islam’s defensive nature are the products of Orientalism. Defensive jihād can only mean the defense of mankind and its liberation from jāhiliyyah:
If we insist on calling Islamic Jihaad a defensive movement, than we must change the meaning of the word ‘defense’ and mean by it ‘the defense of man’ against all those elements which limit his freedom [i.e. beliefs, concepts, and political systems based on economics, race and class distinctions. Basically jahiliyyah-systems or elements]. Ibid. p. 62.
Muslim fighters do not fight in defence of their homelands, but to invite people to Islam and free them of servitude of man, and to bring into the servitude of God, in other words, “from the tyranny of religions into the justice of Islam.” Ibid. p. 71.. This endeavour would not work through the use of argument and discourse ethics alone. It would also require the use of force:
It would be naïve to assume that a call is raised to free the whole world of humankind throughout the earth, and it is confined to preaching and exposition. Indeed, it strives through preaching and exposition when there is freedom of communication and when people are free from all these influences, as ‘There is no compulsion in religion’; but when the abovementioned obstacles and practical difficulties [i.e. elements of jāhiliyyah], are put in its [i.e. Islam’s] way, it has no recourse but to remove them by force so that when it is addressed to peoples’ hearts and minds they are free to accept or reject it with an open mind. Ibid. p. 63. [italics added]
Accordingly, jāhilīyyah makes people unable to accept Islam as their religion. Therefore all the jahili obstacles would have to be gone to enable people to see the true religion and that becoming Muslim is the best way to organise their lives. Thus, preaching cannot eradicate world jāhilīyyah on its own. More importantly, the above citations suggest that Qutb’s ideas have a wider scope than Egypt or the other countries in the Middle East; his idea of jihād encompasses the world. Here we need to stop and evaluate. So far Qutb is encouraging jihād to rid the world of jāhilīyyah, for only then could people be susceptible to Islam. This reading of Qutb’s argument does clash with these words from Milestones:
This [task of removing jāhilīyyah] cannot come about by going along a few steps with Jahiliyyah, nor by now severing relations with it and removing ourselves [the Muslims] to a separate corner; never. The correct procedure is to mix with discretion, give and take with dignity, speak the truth with love, and show the superiority of the Faith with humility. After all this, we must realize the fact that we live in the midst of Jahiliyyah, that our way of life is straighter than that of Jahiliyyah, and that the change from Jahiliyyah to Islam is vast and far-reaching. The chasm between Islam and Jahiliyyah is great, and a bridge is not to be built across it so that the people on the two sides may mix with each other, but only so that the people of Jahiliyyah may come over to Islam, whether they reside in a so-called Islamic country and consider themselves Muslims or they are outside the 'Islamic' country, in order that they may come out of darkness into light and may get rid of their miserable condition, and enjoy those blessings which we have tasted-we who have understood Islam and live in its atmosphere. If not, then we shall say to them what God commanded His Messenger -peace be on him-to say:
‘For you your way, for me mine.’ (109:6) Ibid. p. 140. [italics added]
This statement leaves room for interpretation, especially because of Qutb’s quotation of the Quran, for you your way (meaning faith), and for me mine. This gives the impression that Islam should not be coerced upon anyone, which seemingly contradicts the idea of the eradication of jāhilīyyah by force. At the same time, as we have learned earlier, Qutb argues that Islam is more than a religion; it covers all societal needs. As such, Islam could be seen as a political system which is based on the Sharia. As in any nation-state, people living in it would have to live according to its laws. In this perspective, the non-Muslims residing in Muslim countries (and Muslims living in Christian countries) would have to follow Islamic law but without being forced to give up their own faith and beliefs, and thus there would be freedom of religion. Although, the violent aspect of jihād (as per Qutb) cannot easily be waved off, nor ignored. It could be interpreted as in the example of the Prophet, that in a world full of jāhilīyyah, it may at first be wise to restrain from fighting, to wait until the time is right to do so, i.e. to clear the way for striving through preaching. Some have interpreted Qutb’s jihād as meaning both an armed and an intellectual struggle. Habeck (2006) p.36 Essentially, due to the ambiguity of Qutb’s text, there is support for several readings. The reading that will be advocated here, though, is that Qutb contends that jihād is an armed (as well as an intellectual) struggle to eradicate jāhilīyyah worldwide. First by armed struggle against its jahili leadership, and then through preaching and debate.
References:
Books Books that do not have any printing location are e-books.
Abdo, Geneive (2002) No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam. OUP.
Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Mansouri, Fethi (2007) Islam and Political Violence. Tauris Academic Studies.
Azzam, Sheik Abdullah, Join the Caravan, English translation in pdf.
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Cooper, Barry (2004) New Political Religions, or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism. University of Missouri Press.
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Arabic: سيد قطب (١٩٧٣)"معالم فى الطريق"..بيروت،القاهرة ..طبعة : دار الشروق
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Articles
Cragin, Kim R, (2008) “Early History of Al-Qa’ida”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, No. 4.
Evans, Alexander (2007) “The Man and the Message: The World According To Bin Laden”, Asian Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. II, Routledge.
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Hansen, Hendrik & Kainz, Peter (2007) “Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: a Comparison of Sayyid Qutb’s Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 8, No. 1.
Shepard, William (1997) “The Myth of Progress in the Writings of Sayyid Qutb”, Religion, Vol. 27.
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