Does the Stockholm Suicide Attack Question Theories About Terrorism?

Does the Stockholm Suicide Attack Question Theories About Terrorism?

There are many theories about the causes of Islamic terrorism targeting the West. Some emphasize psychological causes, others socioeconomic or social reasons. Also common are those who seek an explanation in policies or religion, ideology. One position argues that policies (eg. toward the Middle East) cause terrorism, while opponents of this argument claim that policies have little or nothing to do with terrorism. Proponents of the first argument are for example Michael Scheuer, and Robert Pape (1). Others, such as Islam-critic extraordinaire Robert Spencer, argue that religion/ideology is the root problem. Concerning US involvement in the Middle East and throughout the Muslim world, there is much evidence to support the line of Pape and Scheuer. That is, Islamist militancy directed against US interests could be viewed as a response to a perceived threat (2). The recent suicide attack in Stockholm and the intercepted attack on the Danish newspaper, Gyllandsposten, put this position into question because of the perpetrators’ motivation.
       


On the 11 December 2010, Taimour Abdulwahab, an Iraqi born Swede, blew himself up in a failed terrorist act in the city centre, killing no one but himself. His reasons for doing so were the Swedish military presence in Afghanistan and artist Lars Vilks. In a message, echoing the rhetoric of Usama bin Ladin, Abdullwahab said “now your children, your daughters and your sisters will die as our brothers, our sisters and our children are dying”, (3) His reason for targeting Sweden seems to be consistent with Papes’ theory of suicide terrorism and the arguments of Scheuer. But if we scrutinize the Swedish mission in Afghanistan, as per the general narrative at least, Abdulwahab’s argument becomes far stretched. Accordingly, the Swedish military has only killed when attacked (it has lost five soldiers since 2001/2002) ) (4). Its mission is primarily to provide security to help and enable the reconstruction and development of the Afghan society (5).  People who don’t want them there are either ideology-driven groups, criminal gangs or Taliban who view the Swedish effort as a part of NATO’s war (29 of 48 countries in ISAF are members of NATO). Many groups seem to be driven by local issues. Although not made explicit in Abdulwahab’s message, sent to the press and the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO), seems to be equating US warfare with the Swedish mission. This constitutes the other side of the argument. And indeed, this is not far from the truth considering the close cooperation between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OED) on the one hand, and the joint efforts between Swedish OMLT:s (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team) and Afghan Security Forces, on the other. Swedish troops also work closely with US forces in educating local police in Mazar-e Sharif. The commander of ISAF, General Petraeus, is also responsible for OED, which makes it easier to confuse or conflate the two missions. In addition, perhaps against common belief, ISAF’s mission is not to keep peace, but to enforce it.  

This may also serve as a dilemma for Sweden: by having soldiers on Afghan soil, Sweden at the same time, axiomatically, is helping the United States in its war efforts simply because they don’t need to have their own troops in Sweden’s area of responsibility. Thus, by trying to persuade the Swedish constituency that Sweden should withdraw its forces would probably make considerable difference for the insurgents’ war against the United States and its coalition, especially if other ISAF countries follow suit. Diplomatic cables from 2009 (disclosed by Wikileaks) show that the US pressured the Swedish Government to stay committed to the Afghan mission. Sweden has since then been seeking support from the Swedish Riksdag for additional troops from 500 to 855 (6). Thus, it seems to be in the strategic interest of the United States to have Swedish as well as other troops present.  

The other stated reason for the Stockholm attack was the Swedes’ benign neglect concerning the artist Lars Vilks and his portrait of the Prophet Muhammad as a roundabout dog. This does question the theory of terrorism displayed above, i.e. that terrorism is motivated and caused by foreign occupation or military presence in Muslim countries. In the case of Vilks, his polemic art has roused a lot of resentment throughout the Islamic world, and in May 2010 Vilks’ house was set on fire. Two brothers, Mentor and Mensur Alija were convicted for arson, both denying the charges. Both Muslim, they stated in court that they hated Vilks and that he was the enemy of Islam. Judging by the clumsiness in which the two perpetrators committed this act, it suggests that there wasn’t any organization behind the attack (7). Vilks was also attacked during a lecture he held at the Uppsala University later the same month. Vilks presented a video called “Allah Ho Gaybar”, which showed naked gay men wearing Muhammad masks (8). In any case, the Vilks-issue has mostly been interpreted as a case of freedom of speech or censorship. Many commentators and pundits have championed the case for Vilks’ freedom of expression and his right to ridicule any religion, and against self-censorship in the media. Terrorism has been interpreted as an anti-democratic force, and Abdulwahab has been deemed a “freedom hater” by for example Swedish Prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, who also said that the attack had no connection to the Swedish mission in Afghanistan (9). It’s often stated that terrorists want to intimidate people from leading their ordinary lives. While terrorism might have that effect, it shouldn’t be confused with its objectives, which generally is to enforce policy changes. In the case of Abdullwahab, it’s obvious that he didn’t like Vilks’ drawings, but to make inferences about his general view of freedom of speech is another matter. It’s often forgotten that freedom of speech doesn’t entail that one has the right to say anything (10).  In Sweden there are laws against speaking disparaging about groups because of their ethnicity, religion, nationality, sexual orientation etc. Muslim communities in Sweden reported the paper Nerikes Allehanda (who published Vilks’ drawings) to the Chancellor of Justice (JK) for inciting racial hatred, but the Chancellor Göran Lambertz dismissed the charges (11).              

The question is how the recent attack in Stockholm should be interpreted. Should the theory as per the likes of Pape and Scheuer be rejected? Perhaps not, but it’s important to keep on trying to question and review theories and acknowledge that theories aren’t always set in stone or encompassing in nature. It also depends on which perspective one might have. If we argue that the Swedish mission in Mazar-e Sharif is in fact helping the US and its allies, then the standpoint of Scheuer and Pape shouldn’t be rejected. But on the other hand, if we view the Swedish mission as an isolated mission, then the theory must be put into question, but even more importantly, if we continue to see attacks in Sweden related to Vilks’ art alone, we would definitely need to find new explanatory theories.    



Notes:

(1) See Michael Scheuer 2002, 2004, 2008, Robert Pape: 2007.        
(2) Pape downplays religion as a causing factor saying that difference in religion between two fighting actors tends to worsen conflicts. Scheuer argues differently. He recognizes that Muslims perceive US Middle Eastern policies and the War on Terror as a war on Islam. Accordingly, Muslim insurgents fight to defend their religion, which shouldn’t be confused with whatever views Muslim might have toward Western qualities.
(3) Marier, Rita Devlin “Sweden probes ‘terrorist’ attack claimed by Al-Qaeda-linked website” The Daily Star. [retrieved 13/12/2010] (www.dailystar.com.Ib/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=122487#axzz18eypBMQD)
(4) Recently there has been an increasing amount of attacks, which is commonly held to be caused by the joint operation between Swedish forces and Afghan Security Forces (ANSF).
(5) Parkvall, Lena ”Ny inriktning för svenska styrkorna i Afghanistan”, Försvarets Forum nr. 8/ november 2010. p. 10. See also: UN resolution 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003).
(6) Regeringens proposition 2010/11:35, ”Fortsatt svenskt deltagande i den internationella säkerhetsstyrkan i Afghanistan (ISAF)”. p.27 (www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/15/50/89/58d1518.pdf)
(7)The paper who originally published the picture, Nerikes Allehanda, also received death threats. 

(8) Carlsson, Mattias ”Här går de till attack”, Aftonbladet, published 12/05/2010 [retrieved 04/01/2011] (www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article7114587.ab)
(9) Lindberg/Bergfeldt  “Han hatar vår frihet och vår öppenhet”. Aftonbladet, [retrieved 21/12/2010 ]   (www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article8308383.ab)  
(10) Take for example the Swedish pastor Åke Green who in 2004 was convicted and sentenced to one month in prison for hate speech against homosexuals (the conviction was later acquitted).
(11) Ekot “JK: Vilks teckning inte hets mot folkgrupp”. SRV, [retrieved 4/1/2011] [www.sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=1609113]

Literature 

Pape, Robert A. (2005) Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, NY, Random House.

Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2002), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, Washington, D.C., Brassey’s, first edition.  
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2004), Imperial Hubris- Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror, Dulles, Virginia, Brassey’s, first edition.  
Scheuer, Michael (2008), Marching Toward Hell- America and Islam After Iraq, NY, Free Press. Spencer, Robert (2002) Islam Unveiled. Disturbing Questions About the World’s Fastest-Growing Faith. NY, Encounter Books