Ayman al-Zawahiri
For those who are in the business of reconstructing political theories, there is certainly more in to be found in the statements of al-Zawahiri that could be used to construct a normative political theory, than in the rhetoric of bin Ladin. With this said, al-Zawahiri focus more on the arrangements in a post-jihād state, than bin Ladin does. He acknowledges though that the jihad movement would not be the one to rule in for example Iraq. Al-Zawahiri quotes Sayyid Qutb, and mentions him several times in his works, and essentially they are in agreement concerning the understanding of jāhilīyyah. As in the case of bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri interprets jihād as defensive.
Perception of jāhilīyyah and the Ideal Society
In his book, Bitter Harvest, al-Zawahiri states that the rulers of Muslim countries are apostate because they do not rule according to the Sharia, which means that it is mandatory for Muslims to try and overthrow such regimes. Ibrahim (2007) p. 122. To begin with, democratic systems are man-made systems which by its own nature deprive God his right to pass laws for mankind. Thus, democracy is jāhilīyyah. In al-Zawahiri’s mind, the best system is what he calls monotheocracy. Ibid. p. 124. In such a system God is ‘the sole Legislator’, who’s laws apply to all of humankind. Al-Zawahiri finds support for his argument in the Quran 5:50: “Is it jahiliyyah laws that they wish to be governed by? Who is a better judge than Allah for men whose faith is firm?” Qutb uses the same verse: Qutb (2001/2008) p. 117. What can be said about the ideal society according to al-Zawahiri? Clearly, democracy is not the ideal system because it is a “man-made infidel religion, devised to give the right to legislate to the masses, as opposed to Islam, where all legislative rights belong to Allah Most High: He has no partners.” Ibrahim (2007) p. 130. Democratically elected leaders and legislative branches are doing the work that is God’s sovereign duty. By doing this, for one, the leaders get worshipped by the people, instead of God, and obeying is worshipping, and in Islam the only thing that can be worshipped is God. Ibid. p. 130. Secondly, the legislators become equal of God, and are thus themselves gods. Al-Zawahiri agrees with Qutb on this regard:
Qutb wrote in […] In the Shade of the Koran: ‘Sovereignty is the most exclusive prerogative [i.e. privilege] of godhood.’ Therefore, whoever legislates to a people assumes a divine role among them […]. Ibid. p. 128
The issue of concern here is the dichotomous relationship between Islam and democracy. Like Qutb, al-Zawahiri argues that these systems cannot coexist, thus it is either infidelity or faith, either “jāhilīyyah or Islam.” Ibid. p. 128 There are also many other aspects of democratic systems that al-Zawahiri deem un-Islamic, for example equal rights for citizens. Equality entails apostasy (because of freedom of religion); no differentiation between Muslim and non-Muslims. Equality between men and women contradicts the Quranic verse 4:34 which states that “men have authority over women, for Allah has made the one superior over the other.” Ibid. p. 135. Another translation goes ”Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has made one of them to excel the other, and because they spend (to support them) from their means.” In sum, Islam and democracy are incompatible systems.
Al-Zawahiri is arguing for the establishment of an Islamic fundamentalist state in the middle of the Arab world. He initially singled out Egypt and the Levant as where the Islamic caliphate could be established. Mansfield (2006) p. 201. Islam can not be victorious over atheism without the establishing of this caliphate, he argued in a letter to the al-Qaida leader in Iraq, the now late al-Zarqawi, in October 2005. Ibid. p. 252. Al-Zawahiri critiqued him on the unnecessary public beheadings of foreign hostages, and the suicide operations against Iraq’s Shia leaders and civilians. Ibid. p. 268-69, 273. Al-Zawahiri said in very simple terms that “We don’t need this.” In this regard, he stressed the importance of having the Iraqi people supporting the movement’s actions whose support he felt was on the decline. He also stated that not either the mujāhidīn or al-Qaida would be the ones to rule Iraq after ousting the occupying forces. Ibid. p. 261. Concerning Iraq, he wrote that the Americans needed to be expelled, after which an Islamic authority or emirate could be established and eventually achieve “the level of a caliphate.” Ibid. p. 255. This could either be interpreted as a contradiction to his earlier statements regarding the geographical location of the caliphate, or as a change of hearts regarding the issue, but perhaps more likely to appease al-Zarqawi. The emirate would be run by a shūrā council, which would have extensive knowledge of Islamic laws. This council would probably be based around a model of the majlis al-shūrā that used to lead the al-jihād group in Egypt. Hassan (2004) p. 48. Al-shūrā is the name of sura 42 in the Qur’an. The council would be elected by the Iraqi people to “represent them and overlook the work of the authorities in accordance with the rules of the glorious Sharia.” Mansfield (2006) p. 260. This is all in agreement with al-Zawahiri’s three principles of reform in the Islamic world; Sharia should be the fundament on which every Muslim society rests; liberation of Muslim lands; sovereignty of Muslim lands:
Liberating the Muslim nation, confronting the enemies of Islam, and launching jihad against them require a Muslim authority, established on a Muslim land, that raises the banner of jihad and rallies the Muslims around it. Without achieving this goal our actions will mean nothing more than mere and repeated disturbances that will not lead to the aspired goal, which is the restoration of the caliphate and the dismissal of the invaders from the land of Islam. Ibid. p. 225.
The Sharia was given to the Muslims by God, and the umma “will not accept any other law, after it has suffered from the anti-Islamic trends forcefully imposed on it.” Ibid. p. 247. Sharia can not be implemented when Muslim countries remain occupied. When the occupation has been removed, the Islamic countries should enjoy full sovereignty. This change can come (as we have seen earlier) through armed struggle for the sake of God. An addition, along with jihad there must also be room for invitation to Islam, dawah. Ibid. p. 322.
In sum, al-Zawahiri’s interpretation of jāhilīyyah is consistent with Qutb’s interpretation. Al-Zawahiri (and likewise bin Ladin) considers obedience as a form of worship, which entails departure from tawhid into shirk. He also advocates the Sharia as the only source for legislation in his monotheocratic society. They do part concerning how far they want to extend the struggle against jāhilīyyah. Qutb on a global scale, and al-Zawahiri being more focused on the Middle East and the Muslim world.
Perception of jihād
In Bitter Harvest al-Zawahiri criticised the Muslim Brethren and its call for reformation instead of revolution. Al-Zawahiri critiqued the Muslim Brethren in his pamphlet Bitter Harvest (1991). In the same vain as Qutb, al-Zawahiri argues that the so-called Muslim regimes of the Middle East, are not following Islam, and are thus infidel and apostate regimes. Islamists must ask themselves whether in fact these regimes are Muslim:
The Islamic movements must answer the questions: are the governments in the Muslim countries true Muslims or are they kufr (infidels)? These rulers are obviously kufr and murtaddeen (apostates) because they rule with a law other than that of Allah. Therefore it is a fard ayn [i.e. an individual duty] to wage jihad against them and remove them from their positions. It is not allowed to rule with a law other than that of Allah, as these rulers do. By imposing their own rules instead of God’s they are in fact ridiculing shari’ah laws. Cragin (2008) p. 1054 [italics added]
Al-Zawahiri, like bin Ladin, regard jihād as a means of defending Islam, the Muslim sanctities, values and wealth. This battle affects every Muslim and is not limited to any particular region: Mansfield (2006) p. 223.
The struggle for the Muslim state cannot be considered a regional struggle, certainly not after it had been ascertained that the Crusader alliance led by the United States will not allow any Muslim force to reach power in the Arab countries. Ibid. p. 201.
For the Islamic fundamentalist movement to be victorious over the Western hegemony in the Muslim world it must have “an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region.” Ibid. p. 201. al-Zawahiri describes the jihad movement as fundamentalist. Essentially, the idea (as pointed out earlier) is to restore the once so great caliphate, which would enable them to fend off their antagonists, because then they would have a country to launch their operations from, as stated in Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. There is no solution without jihād, in bringing about political change. Ibid. p. 205. The jihadist movements should not participate in democratic elections, because it is doomed to fail. For example, al-Zawahiri argued that the Algerian Islamic Salvations Front (FIS), had fallen into this trap:
[The Algerian experience] proved to Muslims that the west is not only an infidel but also a hypocrite and a liar. The principles [democratic] that it brags about are exclusive to, and personal property of, its people alone. They are not to be shared by the peoples of Islam […]. [The FIS] men thought that the gates of rule had been opened for them, but they were surprised to see themselves pushed toward the gates of detention camps and prisons and into the cells of the new world order [i.e the Jewish Crusade alliance]. Ibid. p. 205-206.
The Islamic Salvations Front had ‘gone democratic’ and actually won nearly half of the votes in the 1993 election. Noorani (2002) p. 6-7. Because no party had gain more than 50 per cent of the votes, a second round was expected, but were never held. Instead the Islamic Salvations Front was banned. This as an example of why democracy as a means to an end, for the Islamic movement, is false. The Algerian military had stepped in to hinder the Islamic Salvation Front from taking power through a democratically held election, because they feared that they would not remain faithful to the democratic system once they were elected in the second round. The members of the group became imprisoned. The lesson, according to al-Zawahiri, is that secularist democracy and its proponents can not be trusted, and as said earlier al-Zawahiri seem convinced that the Crusader Alliance would not allow for any Muslim party take power in any country in the Arab region (e.g. Hamas in Palestine). For al-Zawahiri it is paramount for the jihadists “not to trust the secularists who have sold Palestine cheaply, and not to be drawn into the secular game of elections in accordance with a secular constitution.” : Mansfield (2006) p. 248-9, and 300, for Hamas see: p. 317. The conclusion therefore is that there are no means of reaching power other than jihād. When would the effort of jihād end? Echoing Usama bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri said in a message addressed to ‘the people of the West’ that “[i]f you […] think that these cardboard governments can protect you, you are wrong. Real security is based on mutual cooperation with the Islamic nation on the basis of mutual respect and the stopping of aggression.” Mansfield (2006) p. 245. Like in the case of bin Ladin, this is crucial to their case for a defensive jihād. This thought can also be observed in al-Zawahiri’s view that neither the mujahadīn nor al-Qaida would rule Iraq after ousting the occupying forces:
[I]t doesn’t appear that the Mujahedeen, much less the al-Qaida in the Land of Two Rivers [i.e. Iraq], will lay claim to governance without the Iraqi people. Not to mention that that would be in contravention of the Shura methodology. That is not practical in my opinion. Ibid. p. 260-61.
Instead, it seems as if these insurgents would not engage in governmental activities per se, but as Qutb said, to ‘clear the way for striving through preaching’. Accordingly, liberated lands would be governed primarily by their inhabitants, in association with others. The Taliban regime is an example of what might happen if the population is excluded from the political process. Ibid. p. 262.
Al-Zawahiri’s perception of jihād is that is a defensive endeavour to free Muslim lands and ultimately to reinstall Islamic law. This notion departs form Qutb, for the latter argues that jihād is an offensive struggle against world jāhilīyyah.
References:
Books Books that do not have any printing location are e-books.
Abdo, Geneive (2002) No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam. OUP.
Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Mansouri, Fethi (2007) Islam and Political Violence. Tauris Academic Studies.
Azzam, Sheik Abdullah, Join the Caravan, English translation in pdf.
Cook, David (2005) Understanding Jihad. University of California Press.
Cooper, Barry (2004) New Political Religions, or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism. University of Missouri Press.
Davis, Joyce M. (2003) Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan
Esposito, John L. (2003) Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. NY, OUP.
Esposito, John L. (2005) Islam. The Straight Path. NY, OUP, 3rd ed.
Euben, Roxanne L. (1999) Enemy in the Mirror. Princeton University Press.
Gold, Dore (2003) Hatred’s Kingdom. How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism. D.C., Regnery Publishing, Inc.
Habeck, Mary (2006) Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror. Yale, Yale University Press.
Hamdi, Hassan A. (2004), Al-Qaeda: The Background of the Pursuit for Global Jihad, Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksell International.
Ibrahim, Raymond (2007) The Al Qaeda Reader. NY, Broadway Books.
Kenney, Jeffrey T. (2006) Muslim Rebels: Kharijite Rhetoric and the Politics of Extremism in Modern Egypt. Oxford University Press.
Kepel, Gilles (2004) The War for Muslim Minds. Islam and the West. Cambridge, The Belknap Press of HUP.
Kepel, Gilles (1984/2003) Muslim Extremism in Egypt. The Prophet and the Pharaoh. California, UCP.
Lapidus, Ira M. (2002) A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge, CUP, 2nd ed.
Lawrence, Bruce [ed.] (2005) Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden. NY, Verso.
Mansfield, Laura (2006) His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri. USA, Lulu, TLG Publications. (Includes Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner)
Ménoret, Pascal (2005) The Saudi Enigma. A History. London, Zed Books.
Noorani, A. G. (2002) Islam & Jihad. Prejudice versus Reality. London, Zed Books Ltd.
Pape, Robert A. (2006) Dying To Win. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. NY, Random House Trade Paperbacks.
Qutb, Sayyid (2001) Milestones. New Delhi, Islamic Book Service.
Qutb, Sayyid (1973) Signposts Along the Way. Beirut/ Cairo, Dar al-Shurūq.
Arabic: سيد قطب (١٩٧٣)"معالم فى الطريق"..بيروت،القاهرة ..طبعة : دار الشروق
Can be downloaded in pdf [http://www.mediafire.com/?tkh4wjcqzli]
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2002), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, D.C., Brassey’s, first edition.
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2004), Imperial Hubris- Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror, Dulles, Virginia, Brassey’s, first edition.
Timmerman, Kenneth R. (2004) Preachers of Hate. Islam and the War on America, NY, Three Rivers Press.
Wehr, Hans (1994) The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. 4th ed.
Wright, Lawrence (2007), The Looming Tower- Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New York, Vintage Books.
Al-Zawahiri, Ayman (2001) Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. (Originally published on a website منبر التوحيد والجهاد / minbar al-tawhid wa al-jihad, English: “pulpit of monotheism and jihad”
Zeidan, David (2003) Resurgence of Religion: A Comparative Study of Selected Themes in Christian and Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses. Brill, N.H.E.J., N.V. Koninklijke, Boekhandel en Drukkerij
Articles
Cragin, Kim R, (2008) “Early History of Al-Qa’ida”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, No. 4.
Evans, Alexander (2007) “The Man and the Message: The World According To Bin Laden”, Asian Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. II, Routledge.
Gwynne, Rosalind W. (2006)”Usama bin Ladin, the Qur’an and Jihad”, Religion, Vol. 36.
Hansen, Hendrik & Kainz, Peter (2007) “Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: a Comparison of Sayyid Qutb’s Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 8, No. 1.
Shepard, William (1997) “The Myth of Progress in the Writings of Sayyid Qutb”, Religion, Vol. 27.
For those who are in the business of reconstructing political theories, there is certainly more in to be found in the statements of al-Zawahiri that could be used to construct a normative political theory, than in the rhetoric of bin Ladin. With this said, al-Zawahiri focus more on the arrangements in a post-jihād state, than bin Ladin does. He acknowledges though that the jihad movement would not be the one to rule in for example Iraq. Al-Zawahiri quotes Sayyid Qutb, and mentions him several times in his works, and essentially they are in agreement concerning the understanding of jāhilīyyah. As in the case of bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri interprets jihād as defensive.
Perception of jāhilīyyah and the Ideal Society
In his book, Bitter Harvest, al-Zawahiri states that the rulers of Muslim countries are apostate because they do not rule according to the Sharia, which means that it is mandatory for Muslims to try and overthrow such regimes. Ibrahim (2007) p. 122. To begin with, democratic systems are man-made systems which by its own nature deprive God his right to pass laws for mankind. Thus, democracy is jāhilīyyah. In al-Zawahiri’s mind, the best system is what he calls monotheocracy. Ibid. p. 124. In such a system God is ‘the sole Legislator’, who’s laws apply to all of humankind. Al-Zawahiri finds support for his argument in the Quran 5:50: “Is it jahiliyyah laws that they wish to be governed by? Who is a better judge than Allah for men whose faith is firm?” Qutb uses the same verse: Qutb (2001/2008) p. 117. What can be said about the ideal society according to al-Zawahiri? Clearly, democracy is not the ideal system because it is a “man-made infidel religion, devised to give the right to legislate to the masses, as opposed to Islam, where all legislative rights belong to Allah Most High: He has no partners.” Ibrahim (2007) p. 130. Democratically elected leaders and legislative branches are doing the work that is God’s sovereign duty. By doing this, for one, the leaders get worshipped by the people, instead of God, and obeying is worshipping, and in Islam the only thing that can be worshipped is God. Ibid. p. 130. Secondly, the legislators become equal of God, and are thus themselves gods. Al-Zawahiri agrees with Qutb on this regard:
Qutb wrote in […] In the Shade of the Koran: ‘Sovereignty is the most exclusive prerogative [i.e. privilege] of godhood.’ Therefore, whoever legislates to a people assumes a divine role among them […]. Ibid. p. 128
The issue of concern here is the dichotomous relationship between Islam and democracy. Like Qutb, al-Zawahiri argues that these systems cannot coexist, thus it is either infidelity or faith, either “jāhilīyyah or Islam.” Ibid. p. 128 There are also many other aspects of democratic systems that al-Zawahiri deem un-Islamic, for example equal rights for citizens. Equality entails apostasy (because of freedom of religion); no differentiation between Muslim and non-Muslims. Equality between men and women contradicts the Quranic verse 4:34 which states that “men have authority over women, for Allah has made the one superior over the other.” Ibid. p. 135. Another translation goes ”Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has made one of them to excel the other, and because they spend (to support them) from their means.” In sum, Islam and democracy are incompatible systems.
Al-Zawahiri is arguing for the establishment of an Islamic fundamentalist state in the middle of the Arab world. He initially singled out Egypt and the Levant as where the Islamic caliphate could be established. Mansfield (2006) p. 201. Islam can not be victorious over atheism without the establishing of this caliphate, he argued in a letter to the al-Qaida leader in Iraq, the now late al-Zarqawi, in October 2005. Ibid. p. 252. Al-Zawahiri critiqued him on the unnecessary public beheadings of foreign hostages, and the suicide operations against Iraq’s Shia leaders and civilians. Ibid. p. 268-69, 273. Al-Zawahiri said in very simple terms that “We don’t need this.” In this regard, he stressed the importance of having the Iraqi people supporting the movement’s actions whose support he felt was on the decline. He also stated that not either the mujāhidīn or al-Qaida would be the ones to rule Iraq after ousting the occupying forces. Ibid. p. 261. Concerning Iraq, he wrote that the Americans needed to be expelled, after which an Islamic authority or emirate could be established and eventually achieve “the level of a caliphate.” Ibid. p. 255. This could either be interpreted as a contradiction to his earlier statements regarding the geographical location of the caliphate, or as a change of hearts regarding the issue, but perhaps more likely to appease al-Zarqawi. The emirate would be run by a shūrā council, which would have extensive knowledge of Islamic laws. This council would probably be based around a model of the majlis al-shūrā that used to lead the al-jihād group in Egypt. Hassan (2004) p. 48. Al-shūrā is the name of sura 42 in the Qur’an. The council would be elected by the Iraqi people to “represent them and overlook the work of the authorities in accordance with the rules of the glorious Sharia.” Mansfield (2006) p. 260. This is all in agreement with al-Zawahiri’s three principles of reform in the Islamic world; Sharia should be the fundament on which every Muslim society rests; liberation of Muslim lands; sovereignty of Muslim lands:
Liberating the Muslim nation, confronting the enemies of Islam, and launching jihad against them require a Muslim authority, established on a Muslim land, that raises the banner of jihad and rallies the Muslims around it. Without achieving this goal our actions will mean nothing more than mere and repeated disturbances that will not lead to the aspired goal, which is the restoration of the caliphate and the dismissal of the invaders from the land of Islam. Ibid. p. 225.
The Sharia was given to the Muslims by God, and the umma “will not accept any other law, after it has suffered from the anti-Islamic trends forcefully imposed on it.” Ibid. p. 247. Sharia can not be implemented when Muslim countries remain occupied. When the occupation has been removed, the Islamic countries should enjoy full sovereignty. This change can come (as we have seen earlier) through armed struggle for the sake of God. An addition, along with jihad there must also be room for invitation to Islam, dawah. Ibid. p. 322.
In sum, al-Zawahiri’s interpretation of jāhilīyyah is consistent with Qutb’s interpretation. Al-Zawahiri (and likewise bin Ladin) considers obedience as a form of worship, which entails departure from tawhid into shirk. He also advocates the Sharia as the only source for legislation in his monotheocratic society. They do part concerning how far they want to extend the struggle against jāhilīyyah. Qutb on a global scale, and al-Zawahiri being more focused on the Middle East and the Muslim world.
Perception of jihād
In Bitter Harvest al-Zawahiri criticised the Muslim Brethren and its call for reformation instead of revolution. Al-Zawahiri critiqued the Muslim Brethren in his pamphlet Bitter Harvest (1991). In the same vain as Qutb, al-Zawahiri argues that the so-called Muslim regimes of the Middle East, are not following Islam, and are thus infidel and apostate regimes. Islamists must ask themselves whether in fact these regimes are Muslim:
The Islamic movements must answer the questions: are the governments in the Muslim countries true Muslims or are they kufr (infidels)? These rulers are obviously kufr and murtaddeen (apostates) because they rule with a law other than that of Allah. Therefore it is a fard ayn [i.e. an individual duty] to wage jihad against them and remove them from their positions. It is not allowed to rule with a law other than that of Allah, as these rulers do. By imposing their own rules instead of God’s they are in fact ridiculing shari’ah laws. Cragin (2008) p. 1054 [italics added]
Al-Zawahiri, like bin Ladin, regard jihād as a means of defending Islam, the Muslim sanctities, values and wealth. This battle affects every Muslim and is not limited to any particular region: Mansfield (2006) p. 223.
The struggle for the Muslim state cannot be considered a regional struggle, certainly not after it had been ascertained that the Crusader alliance led by the United States will not allow any Muslim force to reach power in the Arab countries. Ibid. p. 201.
For the Islamic fundamentalist movement to be victorious over the Western hegemony in the Muslim world it must have “an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region.” Ibid. p. 201. al-Zawahiri describes the jihad movement as fundamentalist. Essentially, the idea (as pointed out earlier) is to restore the once so great caliphate, which would enable them to fend off their antagonists, because then they would have a country to launch their operations from, as stated in Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. There is no solution without jihād, in bringing about political change. Ibid. p. 205. The jihadist movements should not participate in democratic elections, because it is doomed to fail. For example, al-Zawahiri argued that the Algerian Islamic Salvations Front (FIS), had fallen into this trap:
[The Algerian experience] proved to Muslims that the west is not only an infidel but also a hypocrite and a liar. The principles [democratic] that it brags about are exclusive to, and personal property of, its people alone. They are not to be shared by the peoples of Islam […]. [The FIS] men thought that the gates of rule had been opened for them, but they were surprised to see themselves pushed toward the gates of detention camps and prisons and into the cells of the new world order [i.e the Jewish Crusade alliance]. Ibid. p. 205-206.
The Islamic Salvations Front had ‘gone democratic’ and actually won nearly half of the votes in the 1993 election. Noorani (2002) p. 6-7. Because no party had gain more than 50 per cent of the votes, a second round was expected, but were never held. Instead the Islamic Salvations Front was banned. This as an example of why democracy as a means to an end, for the Islamic movement, is false. The Algerian military had stepped in to hinder the Islamic Salvation Front from taking power through a democratically held election, because they feared that they would not remain faithful to the democratic system once they were elected in the second round. The members of the group became imprisoned. The lesson, according to al-Zawahiri, is that secularist democracy and its proponents can not be trusted, and as said earlier al-Zawahiri seem convinced that the Crusader Alliance would not allow for any Muslim party take power in any country in the Arab region (e.g. Hamas in Palestine). For al-Zawahiri it is paramount for the jihadists “not to trust the secularists who have sold Palestine cheaply, and not to be drawn into the secular game of elections in accordance with a secular constitution.” : Mansfield (2006) p. 248-9, and 300, for Hamas see: p. 317. The conclusion therefore is that there are no means of reaching power other than jihād. When would the effort of jihād end? Echoing Usama bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri said in a message addressed to ‘the people of the West’ that “[i]f you […] think that these cardboard governments can protect you, you are wrong. Real security is based on mutual cooperation with the Islamic nation on the basis of mutual respect and the stopping of aggression.” Mansfield (2006) p. 245. Like in the case of bin Ladin, this is crucial to their case for a defensive jihād. This thought can also be observed in al-Zawahiri’s view that neither the mujahadīn nor al-Qaida would rule Iraq after ousting the occupying forces:
[I]t doesn’t appear that the Mujahedeen, much less the al-Qaida in the Land of Two Rivers [i.e. Iraq], will lay claim to governance without the Iraqi people. Not to mention that that would be in contravention of the Shura methodology. That is not practical in my opinion. Ibid. p. 260-61.
Instead, it seems as if these insurgents would not engage in governmental activities per se, but as Qutb said, to ‘clear the way for striving through preaching’. Accordingly, liberated lands would be governed primarily by their inhabitants, in association with others. The Taliban regime is an example of what might happen if the population is excluded from the political process. Ibid. p. 262.
Al-Zawahiri’s perception of jihād is that is a defensive endeavour to free Muslim lands and ultimately to reinstall Islamic law. This notion departs form Qutb, for the latter argues that jihād is an offensive struggle against world jāhilīyyah.
References:
Books Books that do not have any printing location are e-books.
Abdo, Geneive (2002) No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam. OUP.
Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Mansouri, Fethi (2007) Islam and Political Violence. Tauris Academic Studies.
Azzam, Sheik Abdullah, Join the Caravan, English translation in pdf.
Cook, David (2005) Understanding Jihad. University of California Press.
Cooper, Barry (2004) New Political Religions, or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism. University of Missouri Press.
Davis, Joyce M. (2003) Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan
Esposito, John L. (2003) Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. NY, OUP.
Esposito, John L. (2005) Islam. The Straight Path. NY, OUP, 3rd ed.
Euben, Roxanne L. (1999) Enemy in the Mirror. Princeton University Press.
Gold, Dore (2003) Hatred’s Kingdom. How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism. D.C., Regnery Publishing, Inc.
Habeck, Mary (2006) Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror. Yale, Yale University Press.
Hamdi, Hassan A. (2004), Al-Qaeda: The Background of the Pursuit for Global Jihad, Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksell International.
Ibrahim, Raymond (2007) The Al Qaeda Reader. NY, Broadway Books.
Kenney, Jeffrey T. (2006) Muslim Rebels: Kharijite Rhetoric and the Politics of Extremism in Modern Egypt. Oxford University Press.
Kepel, Gilles (2004) The War for Muslim Minds. Islam and the West. Cambridge, The Belknap Press of HUP.
Kepel, Gilles (1984/2003) Muslim Extremism in Egypt. The Prophet and the Pharaoh. California, UCP.
Lapidus, Ira M. (2002) A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge, CUP, 2nd ed.
Lawrence, Bruce [ed.] (2005) Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden. NY, Verso.
Mansfield, Laura (2006) His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri. USA, Lulu, TLG Publications. (Includes Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner)
Ménoret, Pascal (2005) The Saudi Enigma. A History. London, Zed Books.
Noorani, A. G. (2002) Islam & Jihad. Prejudice versus Reality. London, Zed Books Ltd.
Pape, Robert A. (2006) Dying To Win. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. NY, Random House Trade Paperbacks.
Qutb, Sayyid (2001) Milestones. New Delhi, Islamic Book Service.
Qutb, Sayyid (1973) Signposts Along the Way. Beirut/ Cairo, Dar al-Shurūq.
Arabic: سيد قطب (١٩٧٣)"معالم فى الطريق"..بيروت،القاهرة ..طبعة : دار الشروق
Can be downloaded in pdf [http://www.mediafire.com/?tkh4wjcqzli]
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2002), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, D.C., Brassey’s, first edition.
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2004), Imperial Hubris- Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror, Dulles, Virginia, Brassey’s, first edition.
Timmerman, Kenneth R. (2004) Preachers of Hate. Islam and the War on America, NY, Three Rivers Press.
Wehr, Hans (1994) The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. 4th ed.
Wright, Lawrence (2007), The Looming Tower- Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New York, Vintage Books.
Al-Zawahiri, Ayman (2001) Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. (Originally published on a website منبر التوحيد والجهاد / minbar al-tawhid wa al-jihad, English: “pulpit of monotheism and jihad”
Zeidan, David (2003) Resurgence of Religion: A Comparative Study of Selected Themes in Christian and Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses. Brill, N.H.E.J., N.V. Koninklijke, Boekhandel en Drukkerij
Articles
Cragin, Kim R, (2008) “Early History of Al-Qa’ida”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, No. 4.
Evans, Alexander (2007) “The Man and the Message: The World According To Bin Laden”, Asian Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. II, Routledge.
Gwynne, Rosalind W. (2006)”Usama bin Ladin, the Qur’an and Jihad”, Religion, Vol. 36.
Hansen, Hendrik & Kainz, Peter (2007) “Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: a Comparison of Sayyid Qutb’s Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 8, No. 1.
Shepard, William (1997) “The Myth of Progress in the Writings of Sayyid Qutb”, Religion, Vol. 27.
