Goldstonerapporten är fortfarande giltig

I efterdyningarna av kriget i Gaza dec -jan 2008-2009 publicerades flertalet rapporter (1). Den mest kända, Goldstonerapporten fick ett större genomslag än de rapporter som Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International m.fl. producerat. Den slutsats som kom att ifrågasättas mest i Richard Goldstones rapport var påståendet att Israel haft som policy att attackera civila. I en artikel i tidningen Washington Post, tog författaren till rapporten tillbaka detta påstående men menar samtidigt att denna felaktiga slutsats delvis berott på att Israel inte samarbetat med FN eller bidragit med information. Givetvis kan detta bero på föreställningen om att FN:s Råd för Mänskliga Rättigheter har ansetts ha en anti-Israelisk bias. Och visst finns det fog för detta och till Goldstones förtjänst ändrades det ursprungliga FN mandadet för undersökningen rörande Gazakonflikten till att omfatta krigsförbrytelser begångna av alla parter. Rapporten har av vissa Israeliska politiker liknats med falsariet Sions vises protokoll. Nu har också krav kommit från Israeliska topp-politiker att Goldstone skall skriva en en "riktig" rapport som visar hur Palestinisk terrorism paralyserar barnen i södra Israel.


Det intressanta för tillfället är den föreställning som nu förs fram, nämligen att Goldstonerapporten är ogiltig. Exempelvis så skriver man i SvD att Goldstone nu tagit "avstånd från sin egen rapport". På politikbloggen jinge.se skriver man att Israel utövat utpressning på Goldstone, vilket då skulle fått honom att dra tillbaka delar av rapporten. Moderaten Gunnar Hökmark ställer sig frågan vad nu Israel-kritiker såsom Per Garthon och Jan Gulliou som använt rapporten som referens skall göra. Vidare ifrågasätter han varför påståendena om Israels medvetna attacker på Gazaborna gjordes överhuvudtaget. USA samt Israel kräver att rapporten skall återkallas. Det märkliga är att man anser att Goldstones artikel på något sätt diskrediterar hela rapporten. Det enda som han tar tillbaka är slutsatsen att Israel medvetet skulle ha attackerat civila i Gaza, dvs. att det skulle funnits en policy från politiskt håll som sedan uttryckts i militära order. Goldstone står fortfarande för sin rapport. Faran med att skriva som SvD gör är att man får intrycket att Goldstone kastat hela rapporten i dokumentförstöraren. I min mening är Goldstonerapporten fortfarande giltig.

Sedan är det ju axiomatiskt att om Israel för krig mot Gazaremsan så kommer bomberna att falla på civila, det finns inte mycket annat att träffa. Israel har rätt till självförsvar, vilket Goldstone också medger, men han anser att det är sättet på vilket Israel försvarar sig som är intressant för diskussionen. Bara för att man har rätt till användadet utav våld betyder inte det att man får använda oförsvarligt våld, och det är detta som rapporten undersökt.


Även om nu Israel inte haft som mål att attackera civila så finns det en rad uttalanden från Israeliska politiker som faktiskt visar på att man är villig att använda våld på ett oproportioneligt och urskillningslöst sätt. Israels vice statsminister Eli Yishai sa att för varje raket Hamas skickar, oavsett om de landar i havet, kommer Israel "förstöra hundra hem" i Gaza. Han har även sagt att det borde gå att förstöra Gaza i avskräckande syfte (samma källa som ovan) (2).  Tzipi Livni, Israels utrikesminister har gjort liknande uttalanden. Bland annat har hon sagt att Israels svar på Hamas raketskjutningar visar att Israel kan svara på ett vilt sätt, "[Israel] is a country that when you fire on its citizens it responds by going wild – and this is a good thing." Även om uttalanden som dessa (den senare gjordes under konflikten) inte kan sägas utgöra en officiell policy, vilket nu Goldstone själv också erkänt, säger det en del om inställningen hos en del högt uppsatta Israeliska politiker.

Detta är i sig väldigt störande uttalanden. I ljuset av dessa uttalanden kan man rimligen dra slutsatsen att många som uttalat sig om rapporten ej läst den (skulle gissa att Gunnar Hökmark är en av dem). Och även om man inte utifrån dessa uttalanden kan göra inferenser om en officiell politik så tyder dessa på en skrämmande attityd hos en del Israeliska politiker. Och som redan sagts av många, rapporten är närmare 600 sidor lång och det är inte alla som kan förmå sig att läsa den.

Själv hyser jag en stor respekt för det lidande judar fått utstå genom historien som på sätt och vis kulminerade med förintelsen. Som gymnasieelev fick man hemskickat till sig ett häfte Om detta må ni berätta som syftade till att upplysa om förintelsen och anti-semitism och att detta aldrig skulle få inträffa igen. Vem vet, i framtiden, kanske vi sorgligt nog kommer behöva ge ut en uppdaterad version av Om detta må ni berätta. 






Fotnoter:

(1) Den kontroversielle amerikanske akademikern Norman Finkelstein definierar intressant nog inte Gazakriget som ett krig för om man ser till hur många Israeler respektive Palestinier som dog så går det lite styvt räknat 100 Palestinier för varje Israel (runt 1400/13).
(2) Eli Yishai har nyligen i samband med  Hamas raketattack på en Israelisk skolbuss sagt att Israel måste besvara denna attack för annars riskerar Israel att förlora sin förmåga att avskräcka ("power of deterrence")Israels fiender. Enligt Norman Finkelstein var detta ett starkt skäl till varför Israel attackerade inte bara Gazaremsan vintern 2008-2009, utan även tidigare krig. Yishai är kontroversiell och enligt journalisten Gideon Levy är det märkligt att han trots sina uttalanden fortfarande sitter i regeringen. Yishai har bland annat kommenterat att arbetsinvandringen för med sig en sjukdomar såsom AIDS, hepatit, mässlingen. Han har även rakt ut sagt följande om invandrare som inte är judar:"With all of this sanctimoniousness, do [the workers] not threaten the Zionist project in the State of Israel?" Och som Levy kommenterat liknande uttalanden, skulle Yishai varit en Europeisk politiker och hans åsikter var riktade visavi Israeler skulle Israel förmodligen bryta relationerna med landet ifråga.

Mearsheimer and Walt fails to adress the core issue of the lobbying system

I've just finished reading the remarkable book The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. The book basically argues that the Israel Lobby has much influence over U.S. policy toward the Middle East, and that this has

The authors Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) and Walt (Harvard University) were asked by the Atlantic Monthly to write an article about the Israel Lobby’s impact on U.S. foreign policy. According to the authors, the Atlantic didn’t want to publish it even though the edited version  were in compliance with “prior agreements and incorporating virtually all of [the Atlantic’s] suggestions” (1).  Instead, Mearsheimer and Walt managed to get the article published in the London Review of Books in March of 2006. The article eventually became this book. The article became very popular and criticised: the article was downloaded from university websites 275,000 times by July 2006, and it was attacked in several news papers by people in the Israel lobby, calling the authors anti-semites (2). The article also got much positive feedback and the discussion didn’t die out as some in the Lobby had predicted. The authors believe the article made evident that the policies pursued by the Lobby and the pro-Israel Christian right were not shared by the American people nor the mainstream Jewish community (3).  Mearsheimer and Walt approached this topic not to point the finger at Israel or because they’re anti-American: 

[W]e adress this topic because it is central to some of the moral arguments commonly used to justify an exceptional level of U.S. support for the Jewish State. We focus on Israel’s behaviour […] because the United States focuses an extraordinary degree of support on Israel. (4) 

The special place Israel has in American politics is evident in that anyone who aspires to become the President of the United States “go to considarable lenghts to express their deep personal commitment [to Israel]” (5).  Thus, support for defending Israel is an election-winning strategy and anyone who want to endorse more of a reciprocal policy on the Israel/Palestine issue, will most likely “fall by the wayside.”(6)  Many politicians do mingle with the Israel Lobby: they speak at AIPAC’s conferences, e.g. presidential hopefuls Clinton and Obama, both expressing their commitment to Israel’s security. The question the authors pose is “[w]hy does Israel, and no other country in the world, receive such consistent deference from America’s leading politicians?” (7)  They categorize common arguments as to why Israel receives such support: the strategic argument, which holds that Israel is an important strategic partner and; the moral argument, which emphazize the shared values of Israel and the United States. Both these lines of arguments are mistaken. Israel is a liability in pure strategic terms. At the same time, the authors believe there’s a moral case for protecting Israel if its survival was threatened, but as Israel commits autrocities or “brutal treatment of the Palestinians in the Occupied Terroritories, moral considerations might suggest that the United States pursue a more evenhanded policy toward the two sides, and maybe even lean toward the Palestinians.”(8) The main reason, according to Mearsheimer and Walt, as to why the United States don’t have a more reciprocal approach to the Israel-Palestine question is the Israel Lobby.
The Lobby is described as a “loose coalition of individuals and organizations” that tries to influence US policy so that it favours Israel’s interests. The Lobby doesn’t control US policy and it’s not a conspiracy. Rather, it’s pursuing its aims overtly like any other lobby group, which is legitimate. The Lobby also exersice great influence over U.S. foreign policy, more than any other groups, and politicians from both the parties “fear the lobby’s clout” and therefore don’t want to criticize Israel (9). 
 
The United States have been involved in the region since the Balford Declaration in 1917, which U.S. President Woodrow Wilson endorsed. In 1919, the U.S. send a delegation to inspect the British Mandate of Palestine and it even went against the proposition of the Balfourd Declaration, i.e. the establishment of a Jewish state, because that the inhabitants of the land opposed the influx of Zionist settlers (10).  It wasn’t until after after the Six-Day War in 1967, that the United States would come to support Israel fully. Prior to 1967, the United States had tried to have a balanced policy toward the Middle East. Because of the Arab states was an important strategic assess the United States didn’t want to commit itself to Israel. In the Cold War era Israel was to be viewed as an important strategic asset because the Soviets supported the Arab states with arms sells. Another factor which helped change U.S. policy regarding the Middle East was the growing influence of the Israel Lobby (11). This has been partly due to the Lobby’s efforts to shape public discourse so that it portrays Israel as a strategic ally, and reflects the moral arguments for the special treatment of Israel. Merasheimer and Walt sees this phenomena in the discourse around Carter’s Israel-critic book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid. Because of his critique of Israel’s actions in the Occupied Territories and that it resembles the Apartheid system, Carter has been smeared and deemed an anti-semite and even a Nazi-sympathiser. And because the Lobby’s arguments concerning the moral commitment to Israel and Israel as a strategic ally of the United States, Mearsheimer and Walt says, “it has little choice but to try to stifle or marginalize serious discussion.”(12)  There is a discrepancy between what the American people think about support for Israel and the actual policy. Polls from 2006 for example show that 66 per cent of Americans think that the Israel Lobby has to much influence (13).  The key point made by Mearsheimer and Walt is that this discrepancy is caused by the Lobby’s influence on Capital Hill. Accordingly, the Israel Lobby is by-passing the the electorate, i.e. the Lobby don’t have to try to persuade the American people anything, but the politicians directly. Consider the following short anecdot from Mearsheimer and Walt: 

Steven Rosen, the former AIPAC official who has been indicted for allegedly passing classified documents to Israel, illustrated AIPAC’s power for the New Yorker’s Jeffrey Goldberg by putting a napkin in front of him and saying, “In twenty-four hours, we could have the signatures of seventy senators on this napkin.” These are not idle boasts. […]when issues relating to Israel come to the fore, Congress almost always votes to endorse the lobby’s positions […]. (14)

 
A significant problem to overcome when studying or debating the Israel Lobby becomes apparent when reading Mearsheimer and Walt’s book; the possibility of conflating the Israeli lobby with Judaism or a conspirity. When disclosing the influence of Jewish and pro-Israeli groups one at the very same time is giving leverage to anti-Semitic groups, no matter how one might articulate its case. This is a dilemma which Mearsheimer and Walt acknowledge, but they are in some sense ducking this issue: the bulk of the book explains that people who are pro-Israel exerts to much influence over U.S. Middle Eastern policy. This influence or power is used to advance Israel’s objectives, and it has been a very successful enterprice so far. According to the authors, if it haven’t been for the Israel Lobby U.S. policy would have been more reciprocal, and in effect this would probably have made the Middle East look quite differently than it does. I’m not sure if Mearsheimer and Walt successfully demonstrate the difference between a powerful and thus influential Israel Lobby and a “secret Jewish conspiracy”. The argument that the Lobby exercises their power openly isn’t a good enough argument, because we can just choose to call it an “open conspiracy”. They correctly argue that the Lobby’s power isn’t to say that the Lobby controls the United States, but for the people in for example Palestine it probably looks a lot like it. Another issue which Mearsheimer and Walt fail to address is the normative question whether or not the lobby system is a healthy feature in American politics. If the lobbying groups are by-passing and surpassing the American electorate, what does it mean for the democratic system? This question is paramount, but because Mearsheimer and Walt are themselves Americans, brought up in this political culture, they don’t give any indication that they’ve given this much thought. They contend that the lobbying firms are doing things that any one can do. It‘s as if all Americans are on the same level of influence. As if most Americans could give up their jobs and lobby for their cause. This is analogous to a notion that is commonly held by liberals, i.e. it’s the same for everybody. Well, this is incorrect. Now, the people lobbying for Israel are, according to the authors, much better organized the average groups who summon people to demonstrations because they usually do it on their spare time. The advocators of Israel are perhaps also more ambitious and diligent when it comes to forwarding their issues, while their would be opponents are not. The core criticism of the lobby system is that individuals and groups exercise great influence over decision makers and thus by-passing the voters who are supposed to exercise that power. This is a problem for democracy, not an inevitably feature of a political system. In this respect, I believe that Mearsheimer and Walt fails to adress the core issue, namely the lobbying system itself.







Notes:
(1) Mearsheimer J. John, Walt M. Stephen (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY, Farras, Straus and Giroux. p. vii. According to former U.S. Ambassador to Israel and AIPAC official, Martin Indyk, the Atlantic thought it was to long and Mersheimer and Walt didn’t want cut the article’s size. ( “This House believes the pro-Israeli lobby has succefully stifled Western debate about Israel’s actions”, The Doha Debates [www.thedohadebates.com/debates/debate.asp?d=10&s=3&mode=transcript])
(2) Mearsheimer J. John, Walt M. Stephen (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY, Farras, Straus and Giroux. p. viii.
(3) Mearsheimer J. John, Walt M. Stephen (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY, Farras, Straus and Giroux. p. ix. (4) Mearsheimer J. John, Walt M. Stephen (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY, Farras, Straus and Giroux. p. x. (5) Mearsheimer J. John, Walt M. Stephen (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY, Farras, Straus and Giroux. p. 3.
(6) Mearsheimer J. John, Walt M. Stephen (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY, Farras, Straus and Giroux. p. 3.
(7)Mearsheimer J. John, Walt M. Stephen (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY, Farras, Straus and Giroux. p. 5.
(8) Mearsheimer J. John, Walt M. Stephen (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY, Farras, Straus and Giroux. p. 5.
(9) Mearsheimer J. John, Walt M. Stephen (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY, Farras, Straus and Giroux. p. 6.
(10) Mearsheimer J. John, Walt M. Stephen (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY, Farras, Straus and Giroux. p. 7.
(11) Mearsheimer J. John, Walt M. Stephen (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY, Farras, Straus and Giroux. p. 7.
(12) Mearsheimer J. John, Walt M. Stephen (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY, Farras, Straus and Giroux. p. 10. 
(13) Mearsheimer J. John, Walt M. Stephen (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY, Farras, Straus and Giroux. p. 10.
(14) Mearsheimer J. John, Walt M. Stephen (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. NY, Farras, Straus and Giroux. p. 10-11.  

Angående den eviga diskussionen om känsla och teknik

Angående den eviga diskussionen om känsla och teknik- vad tycker ni? Kommentera gärna.

Vill härmed försöka utveckla en position kring känsla och teknik vad gäller musicerande generellt och gitarrspel specifikt. Om detta har det skrivits spaltkilometrar på webbens alla forum. Ofta beskrivs förhållandet mellan teknik och känsla som en dikotomi (akademiska för motsatsförhållande). Detta medför att analysen av gitarrspel blir förvrängd. Enligt denna dikotomi: ju mer avancerad teknik (exv. Steve Vai, Yngwie,) en gitarrist har desto mindre känsla, och omvänt, mindre teknik mer känsla (exv. Neil Young). Några exempel från nätets alla forum mm:

"Egentligen var det nog Eddie Van Halen och Yngwie Malmsteen som mer eller mindre dödade all känsla när de slog igenom. Efter det var det mest antal noter per sekund som vann.Men jag säger det igen, vad hände med känslan?" *

"Det behövs ingen teknik alls för att uppnå känslofullt spel." (http://www.diskantforum.se/)#

Håller inte med ovanstående. Oavsett vilken musik vi framför behöver vi ju ett tillvägagångssätt, dvs. metod/teknik (oavsett om vi vill spela som Neil Young, Cobain, Gary Moore, YJM, Rebell-Robban).
Logiskt sett,enligt dikotomin känsla-teknik borde då också en person med sämre/mindre teknik få en gitarr att låta bättre. Men om vi tar ett stycke musik, exv. Vintern av Vivaldi, och låter Neil Young (som inte är skolad) framföra detta, kan vi ju anta att oavsett hur mycket känsla han har kommer han inte fixa spela stycket.Han kommer bli tvungen att lära sig vissa tekniker. Först då han lärt sig dessa och lärt sig stycket kan han förmedla känslor. Givetvis kan man ha en förståelse och en känsla för en viss typ av musik innan man de facto kan framföra den. Undertecknad kan själv inte spela jazz, då jag inte lyssnar på eller är särskilt förtjust i jazz, och varje försök till jazz-lir från min sida har i bästa fall slutat i "jazz-satir/parodi", vilket delvis beror på att jag inte förstår jazz.

Tekniskt spel kopplas ofta samman med snabbt spel, vilket är missvisande. Det finns många "långsamma" stycken som kräver mer av spelaren en vissa "snabbare" stycken (exv. inom klassisk musik). Således är denna föreställning inte mer värd än kronan i min ficka.

Jag vill hävda att 1) för att överhuvudtaget kunna spela, behövs en teknik, 2) när tekniken är inövad (dvs. hjärnan och musklerna är synkade) kan känslan s.a.s. komma fram i form av musik."Känsla" kan i min mening syfta på flera saker: dels kan vi s.a.s. ha en "känsla" för musik och olika genrer. Känsla kan också handla om en känsla för instrumentet som verktyg. Teknik kan i sin tur delas in i två underkategorier: a) Enkel teknik [ofta icke-institutionaliserad],och b) advancerad teknik [ofta institutionaliserad]. Med enkel teknik menas teknik som inte nödvändigtvis behöver någon övning, medan advancerad teknik är sådan teknik som kräver mera övning, ofta med hjälp av lärare. Med brist på andra begrepp använder jag "institutionaliserade" tekniker. Dessa tekniker (exv. sweep-, alternate-, economic- [mix av alt. och sweep]), chicken-, hybrid picking, fingerspel) är uttänkta, och har praktiserats och lärts ut under en längre period, och blivit allmängods, mao. institutionaliserade. Enklare metoder eller icke-institutionaliserade dito är tekniker som är ogenomtänkta och kräver i regel mindre av spelaren.

Avslutningsvis kan man finna hur många youtube-gitarrister som helst som kan "lira" ett stycke musik utan att det låter bra. Man kan då fundera kring huruvida personen kan anses kunna spela ett stycke ifall det låter illa eller falskt?! Poängen är att många gitarrister kan metoderna (dvs. teknik) men saknar förståelsen/känslan för den musik de vill framföra. Märk nu att jag inte lägger någon värdering i vad musik kan vara. Melodiskt spel kan båda vara musik (liksom rytmer som saknar melodi). Tummregeln borde vara att låter någonting bra så torde det finnas en känsla och förståelse hos utövaren.Det kan dock vara nyttigt för personer som skriver under på dikotomin känsla-teknik att för sakens skull "youtuba" valfri låt med exv. Yngwie Malmsteen med suffixet "cover". Jag lovar att 90 procent av klippen kommer låta skit, medan 10 procent kommer låta bra. Slutsatsen bör då bli att det krävs mer än teknik för att få ett stycke att låta bra, medan det är förståelsen i.e. känslan som gör att musiken låter bra.




Noter:

*(http://www.balalaika.nu/gitarrspel-med-kansla/)
# (http://www.diskantforum.se/)

We all have to live by the laws of economics- whether we like it or not

Most people who watch Swedish TV3's "Lyxfällan"  would probably ascribe to the economic philosophy / logic that permeates the program. Namely, that you can not spend more than you have. Some do, however just that by shopping on credit, or borrowed money (which is essentially the same thing). We all know that this is non-sustainable. But how can a person for a long time to live beyond their means as they do in the programme? That's right, through loans. Parents lend their kids money to help them out, but what happens when their resources run out? Parents mortgages the house, but this can only last as long as this money is, and can not pay back the child in question can not be parents to pay their loans. This bubble, in other words,will sooner or later crack. Calling it a "Lyxfällan-logic" that is analogous with the common market economic logic of macro-and micro-level.

But as per our economic system this is not so. According to the Central Bank of Sweden, we spend our way out of crisis (i.e. according to the low interests). Suppose you for a year have less money than usual. What to do? In a makro-like perspective, you spend by borrowing. According to "Lyxfällan-logic" you should be diligent and save. Which option would you prefer? Probably the latter, eventhough it's much harder to do. Consumer society fosters an economic behavior that does not promote saving. Someone might object : "if spend less, many companies in the sales industry will have a tough time, or even worse; fail." This is true. But a major reason for this is that these companies have not saved and built up a reserve to use in bad times.

Me and a friend, who also has an unhealthy interest in guitars, both agreed that a new Fender Stratocaster made in the USA was not worth 12 000 SEK (appr. 1800 dollars), which is what music stores in Sweden charge. It is not that good, frankly. Besides, you can get the same guitar around half of that in the US. So how come people buy these guitars at exorbitant prices? Today you can shop for guitars and other musical equipment on hire purchase (i.e. credit), which costs extra. Suddenly, people can afford to buy a guitar for 12kkr. (with a credit fee of SEK 500-1000). In this way, prices rise. Now if you could not buy on hire purchase, would the price still be the same? Probably not, Why? Suppose every aspiring "young-Yngwie-Malmsteen" or "Steve Vai" would have to save up 12kkr, they would probably find the price to high, which would make prices drop. The logic is simple: to spend, someone has to save. And those who earned their money through saving would also know the true value of money, while those who does not save would not and would therefore be more inclined to spend and possibly buy the expensive guitar.

This example is somewhat analogous to how the Swedish housing market works. Cheap loans make us economically blind. Cheap loans also put our "Lyxfällan-logic" out of play. In an utopian state, a lender would not lend their capital to borrowers who aren't likely to repay, or who's business (consider watching the british TV- show "Dragon's Den") can not generate any income or profits. Now, if a lender would lend money he or she would charge a higher interest rate or a higher share in the borrower's business to counter the risk. One problem with our economy is that we have a Central Bank which lends to banks at low interest rates to "stimulate" the economy. This also means that banks can always get money to continue lending money to people who can not really afford. Banks make money on interest, not by having their clients paying back their loans. Banks can therefore do high-risk business because they know that the central bank has their back. In this economic paradigm, the Central Bank is not going to let the entire banksystem fail. In some sense this is good, because we need banks. But we don't want this to entail bad investments and credits. If banks were to invest their own money and not have access to the Central Bank (think: Dad's wallet), we would probably expect them to behave more cautiously and we would not have a looming housing bubble.

If we now use our "Lyxfällan-logic" as a framework for analysis we can easily se that this won't last for long. Thus, we all have live by the laws of economics whether we like it or not. Regardless of whether we are social democrats, moderate/conservative, communists, feminist, above, below, over whatever ...

What do you think?

Om bloggen al Hamatzav

Jag brukar med stort intresse läsa bloggen "al Hamatzav" som är Israel-vänlig , minst sagt.

Det som gör bloggen bra är dess snabba replikering i kommentarsegmenten. Men till min stora besvikelse gäller detta enbart när andra än jag själv kommenterar inläggen. En av de mest aktiva författarna på bloggen, Ofer Maimon  var till en början väldigt snabb på att svara på ett av mina inlägg,  men när så fort jag motbevisar honom,  blir den annars så rappe  tangentryttaren väldigt inaktiv.  Se framför allt rödmarkerat:



Ofer Maimon 

26. Marcus
    Det sinnessjukt klantiga tillbakadragandet från Libanon resulterade i kriget med Hezbalah och tillbakadragandet från Gaza i Gjutet bly. Samt förstås mängder av raketer och ett antal olagliga tillfångtaganden från arabsidan innan Israel alltså fick nog. Det dessa krig bevisar är att det är knepigt för stater att föra krig med väpnade rörelser som strunta i krigets lagar. Att föra krig med andra stater däremot är en väldig skillnad och det vet Israels fiender, därav bristen på anfall. De skulle ha samma chans som en pepsiburk i helvetet, och få sitt flygvapen och flotta bomabde till mos innan de hann säga flaskhals.
    
    
27. Marcus # 26- Maimon, oavsett om tillbakadragandet var strategiskt fel eller inte, samt huruvida Israels krigsmakt skulle klå Hamas och Hizb’ allah i konventionell strid, så ser inte verkligheten ut. Dessa grupper behöver inte vinna över Israels konventionella styrkor: de behöver endast inte förlora. Vad gäller Israels grannar och deras militära oförmåga, så håller jag med dig; de skulle få problem med Israels krigsmakt, och detta kan avskräcka dem från att anfalla.
    
    Du skriver även att “[d]et dessa krig bevisar är att det är knepigt för stater att föra krig med väpnade rörelser som strunta i krigets lagar.” Sedan när har Israel i praktiken brytt sig om krigets lagar? Israels fiender struntar i krigslagar, det stämmer. Men om nu Israel som “demokratisk stat” skall föregå med gott exempel, varför gör man inte det?
    
    
    
    Exempel:
    * Bosättningar på ockuperad mark (eller administrativa delar). Tolkas som förbjudet enligt Genevekonventionen 4:49 enligt lejonparten av länder som skrivit under konventionen.
    
    
    * Gazaremsan. Det är lättare att argumentera för att Israel’s och Egyptens blockad de facto är kollektiv bestraffning än tvärtom (förbjudet enligt G.konventionen 4:33, senare förtydligat i 2:a protokollet från 1977 (om jag minns rätt så har varken USA eller Israel skrivit under protokollet. Man kan ju fråga sig varför).
    
    
    * Kriget i Gaza. Israel använde fosforbomber i tätbebyggt område vilket strider mot ett tilläggsprotokoll till Genévekonventionen 1980.
    
    
    *Attacken på USS Liberty 1967 vilket dödade drygt 30 och skadade drygt 170 Amerikaner. Israel använde dessutom napalm.
    
    
    Med detta sagt, är det intressant att reflektera kring några saker:
    - Om nu Israels grannländer skulle chanslösa i ett regelrätt krig mot Arabländerna samt att detta då skulle avskräcka dessa från att anfalla, då finns det kanske inte skäl för Israels oro?
    
    
28. Marcus Om nu Israel vill följa “krigets lagar” varför skriver man inte under vissa protokoll? Ta USA som exempel.
    I deras SOFAs (Status of forces agreement) så kan inte exv. Iraq åtala amerikanska soldater för brott som de begår. De är immuna såsom diplomater. Detta rimmar illa. Samtidigt kan de heller inte åtalas i Haagtribunalen. Varför för USA denna policy om nu USA vill föregå med gott exempel och är “the brightest speakers of freedom”? Detta beteende är i vissa fall analogt med Israels beteende. Nej, Israel bör skriva under NPT och samtliga protokoll, och sedan anpassa sin politik efter dessa.
    

Jag har ännu inte fått något svar på mitt inlägg. Är det för att jag har rätt?

Naivt att tro på Obamas ambition om ett kärnvapenfritt Mellanöstern

Har just läst militärstrategen tillika statsvetaren Daniel Hamiltons artikel på sajten Newsmill (ungefär 10 månader för sent, men ändå!). I den kritiserar han de röd-grönas ställningstagande kring USA och dess militär och kärnvapen. En röd-grön regeringen skulle kräva att USA lade ned sina baser i världen, samt att skrota sina kärnvapen. Detta finner Hamilton skrattretande. Underförstått är att USA (tillsammans med andra) utgör en garant för den globala säkerheten. Således är det konstigt att de röd-gröna (särskilt Socialdemokratin) skulle kräva detta av USA, speciellt eftersom Obama dels börjat minska USA militära närvaro i världen, dels för att han fått fredspriset för att han vill ha en kärnvapenfri värld.

Det som jag finner skrattretande i Hamiltons resonemang är bland annat följande: "[Obama] committed the U.S. to support efforts leading to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems." Vad exakt menar Hamilton?  Menar han Iraks kärnvapen? Irans kärnvapen? Libyens? Syriens? Jordaniens? Libanons? Egyptens? Saudi Arabiens? Yemens? Nej, ty dessa länder har ju inte kärnvapen. Hamilton kanske syftar på Israel? Det är ju det enda landet i Mellanöstern som man vet har x-antal hundra kärnvapen (vissa menar att 150 st vore rimligt med tanke på landets ekonomiska förutsättningar och strategiska behov). 


Har Obama pressat Israel vad gäller deras kärnvapenarsenal? Svar: NiklasErikJohan (=nej). Däremot har Obama och Bush före honom pressat Iran om syftet med dess kärnkraftprogram. USA invaderade dessutom Irak med förevändningen att Saddam Hussein hade kärnvapen som han kunde använda, t.o.m. skicka över Atlanten till USA: s östkust. Detta påstående försvagades med tiden då man inte lyckades hitta dessa vapen. 


Kortfattat: om nu Obama och USA var seriösa vad gäller att göra Mellanöstern till en kärnvapenfri zon, kan de börja med att Israel. Detta är föga troligt, således är det naivt att tro på USA i denna fråga.

Jahiliyyah and Jihad - Qutb's influence on bin Laden and al-Zawahiri (part 6)

Conclusion and Discussion

This essay’s aim has been to show in what ways Sayyid Qutb’s ideas are reflected in the rhetoric of Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The concepts in focus have been jāhilīyyah and jihād. In addition, the aim has been to provide a sketch for their thoughts on the ideal society. In comparing these three items, many similarities have been found, but also differences. While this research does not try to make inferences about why certain differences and similarities might be, it will be discussed in this section as we go along.

We begin with some similarities. Qutb, bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri define jāhilīyyah in a similar fashion, i.e. a state of ignorance of Islam. They also use the term to separate Islam from what is not Islam. All three define democracy and its features as a religion of jāhilīyyah. The reason for this description is because it is a man-made system that advocates qualities which contradicts Islam. In this system, leaders, laws are followed and therefore worshipped by the people (to obey, is to worship). Hence, the concept of tawhīd is replaced by shirk, because man, not God is made the sovereign legislator, instigator of morals and values etc. Man is de facto a god. While the perception of jāhilīyyah is the same among the three, however, they do part concerning how it ought to be dealt with. Qutb wants to eradicate jāhilīyyah worldwide by the means of jihād. This goal is shared by neither bin Ladin nor al-Zawahiri. By contrast, they exclusively use jāhilīyyah to describe what does not constitute Islam. They do not mention anything about going out of their ways to remove it from the globe, but solely the Muslim world. They make use of the term in their propaganda against their foes, i.e. the regimes in the Muslim world and its Western supporters. These states have allied themselves with democratic states of the West, and have been influenced by the Western way of thinking, life, and culture at the expense of Islam. Their main goal is to rid the Muslim world of Western influence and what they perceive as an occupation of its sanctities.

Their call for jihād is a defensive call, not an offensive one. This represents a fundamental difference. For one, Qutb clearly states that the notion of jihād as defensive is false and simply erroneous. Islam is an offensive religion, its aim being to bring people worldwide, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, back to their sustainer and thus freeing them from serving others than God. In fact, the new Islamic religion as in the days of Muhammad could be seen as an attempt to bring people back to the straight path to God, which people in those days had deviated from. For Qutb however, jihād can only be defensive if it thereby means in defence of humankind against jāhilīyyah. His stand on defensive jihād also becomes apparent in his interpretation of the struggle against the oppression of Muslims in the early days of Islam. He argues that this struggle was fought for the sake of Islam (not the oppressed), during a passing period after which the real goal of Islam could be pursued. Essentially, it is the duty of all Muslims to fight jāhilīyyah today because it has a chokehold on Islam, and ultimately by fighting it, Muslims will make Islam the dominant religion.  

Unlike Qutb, bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri do not seem to have this agenda, as far as their rhetoric indicates. They do regard jihād as a religious duty (fard ‘ain) and they speak with a lot of emotion about how it is every Muslims duty to defend their suffering Muslim kind in for example Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya etc. This can be done either by fighting, financing, discourse or simply by hating the enemy. This struggle will be needed as long as there is aggression against Muslims and their lands.        
               
Both bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri speak of re-establishing the righteous caliphate and al-Zawahiri even gives suggestions of where it could be based. The idea of a caliphate is not explicitly mentioned in Milestones. Evenly so, Qutb do touch the subject when he talks about the first umma as a role model for the ideal society, which would be necessary to have if Islam would to assume the role of the leadership of mankind. This suggests that he is not against the thought of having someone leading the umma, like the Prophet did (but who would lead the umma of today?). For al-Zawahiri, the caliphate plays an important role. It is pivotal for the struggle against infidel and oppressive regimes to establish a caliphate in the midst of the Middle East, simply because it would give the jihadist movements a country to plan and launch their operations from, which is probably easier than doing it from a cave in the Himalayas. But this strategy as per al-Zawahiri’s statements etc. is confined to the Middle East. Nowhere does he or bin Ladin mention that their struggle is against world atheism, but rather Middle Eastern atheism. The emirate that would precede the caliphate would be lead by a shura council. If a caliphate saw the light they could spread their brand of Islam to the neighbouring countries, and freeing them from oppression.          

Concerning Qutb’s influence on bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri’s rhetoric. As seen, one of the most important concepts of Qutb is jāhilīyyah. This concept, although not first used by Qutb in a modern context but Mawdudi, has made a deep impact on the Muslim extremists, making them see the regimes of the Middle East in a new way, and instigating jihād against world jāhilīyyah. Essentially they are all in some sense intellectually indebted to Qutb, either directly or by proxy (i.e. through other authors who have used Qutb’s ideas). Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri are probably quite familiar to these ideas. Al-Zawahiri quotes Qutb in his statements and works and could be considered directly influenced, while bin Ladin only mentions Muhammad Qutb, which was his lector. This does not mean that bin Ladin is unfamiliar with the work of Sayyid Qutb. On the contrary, it is likely that he read Qutb during his years in the University, and perhaps through al-Zawahiri. In addition, the works of Sayyid Qutb is quite popular in Arabic countries and it is therefore plausible to infer that bin Ladin could have gotten his share of Qutbism that way.

The most interesting finding of this study is the different interpretations of jihād. These discrepancies indicates that bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri are not indebted to Qutb in this regard, except perhaps for the use of force against anti-Islamic elements. It also seems reasonable to think that they have been more influenced by people like Abdullah Azzam, who also had more of a defensive message than Qutb had, and whom they had worked together with in Peshawar. In any case, the difference concerning the perception of jihād is so fundamental that it is quite phenomenal that none of the sources used for this essay have picked it up. Fundamental, since it deals with the real nature of Islam, its true meaning and purpose.    

Jahiliyyah and Jihad - Qutb's influence on bin Laden and al-Zawahiri (part 5)

Ayman al-Zawahiri

For those who are in the business of reconstructing political theories, there is certainly more in to be found in the statements of al-Zawahiri that could be used to construct a normative political theory, than in the rhetoric of bin Ladin. With this said, al-Zawahiri focus more on the arrangements in a post-jihād state, than bin Ladin does. He acknowledges though that the jihad movement would not be the one to rule in for example Iraq. Al-Zawahiri quotes Sayyid Qutb, and mentions him several times in his works, and essentially they are in agreement concerning the understanding of jāhilīyyah. As in the case of bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri interprets jihād as defensive.
      Perception of jāhilīyyah and the Ideal Society

In his book, Bitter Harvest, al-Zawahiri states that the rulers of Muslim countries are apostate because they do not rule according to the Sharia, which means that it is mandatory for Muslims to try and overthrow such regimes. Ibrahim (2007) p. 122. To begin with, democratic systems are man-made systems which by its own nature deprive God his right to pass laws for mankind. Thus, democracy is jāhilīyyah. In al-Zawahiri’s mind, the best system is what he calls monotheocracy. Ibid.  p. 124. In such a system God is ‘the sole Legislator’, who’s laws apply to all of humankind. Al-Zawahiri finds support for his argument in the Quran 5:50: “Is it jahiliyyah laws that they wish to be governed by? Who is a better judge than Allah for men whose faith is firm?” Qutb uses the same verse: Qutb (2001/2008) p. 117.  What can be said about the ideal society according to al-Zawahiri? Clearly, democracy is not the ideal system because it is a “man-made infidel religion, devised to give the right to legislate to the masses, as opposed to Islam, where all legislative rights belong to Allah Most High: He has no partners.” Ibrahim (2007) p. 130. Democratically elected leaders and legislative branches are doing the work that is God’s sovereign duty. By doing this, for one, the leaders get worshipped by the people, instead of God, and obeying is worshipping, and in Islam the only thing that can be worshipped is God. Ibid.  p. 130. Secondly, the legislators become equal of God, and are thus themselves gods. Al-Zawahiri agrees with Qutb on this regard:

Qutb wrote in […] In the Shade of the Koran: ‘Sovereignty is the most exclusive prerogative [i.e. privilege] of godhood.’ Therefore, whoever legislates to a people assumes a divine role among them […]. Ibid.  p. 128  

The issue of concern here is the dichotomous relationship between Islam and democracy. Like Qutb, al-Zawahiri argues that these systems cannot coexist, thus it is either infidelity or faith, either “jāhilīyyah or Islam.” Ibid.  p. 128 There are also many other aspects of democratic systems that al-Zawahiri deem un-Islamic, for example equal rights for citizens. Equality entails apostasy (because of freedom of religion); no differentiation between Muslim and non-Muslims. Equality between men and women contradicts the Quranic verse 4:34 which states that “men have authority over women, for Allah has made the one superior over the other.” Ibid.  p. 135. Another translation goes ”Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has made one of them to excel the other, and because they spend (to support them) from their means.” In sum, Islam and democracy are incompatible systems.
 
Al-Zawahiri is arguing for the establishment of an Islamic fundamentalist state in the middle of the Arab world. He initially singled out Egypt and the Levant as where the Islamic caliphate could be established. Mansfield (2006) p. 201. Islam can not be victorious over atheism without the establishing of this caliphate, he argued in a letter to the al-Qaida leader in Iraq, the now late al-Zarqawi, in October 2005. Ibid.  p. 252. Al-Zawahiri critiqued him on the unnecessary public beheadings of foreign hostages, and the suicide operations against Iraq’s Shia leaders and civilians. Ibid.  p. 268-69, 273. Al-Zawahiri said in very simple terms that “We don’t need this.”   In this regard, he stressed the importance of having the Iraqi people supporting the movement’s actions whose support he felt was on the decline. He also stated that not either the mujāhidīn or al-Qaida would be the ones to rule Iraq after ousting the occupying forces. Ibid.  p. 261.  Concerning Iraq, he wrote that the Americans needed to be expelled, after which an Islamic authority or emirate could be established and eventually achieve “the level of a caliphate.” Ibid.  p. 255. This could either be interpreted as a contradiction to his earlier statements regarding the geographical location of the caliphate, or as a change of hearts regarding the issue, but perhaps more likely to appease al-Zarqawi. The emirate would be run by a shūrā council, which would have extensive knowledge of Islamic laws. This council would probably be based around a model of the majlis al-shūrā that used to lead the al-jihād group in Egypt. Hassan (2004) p. 48. Al-shūrā is the name of sura 42 in the Qur’an. The council would be elected by the Iraqi people to “represent them and overlook the work of the authorities in accordance with the rules of the glorious Sharia.” Mansfield (2006) p. 260. This is all in agreement with al-Zawahiri’s three principles of reform in the Islamic world; Sharia should be the fundament on which every Muslim society rests; liberation of Muslim lands; sovereignty of Muslim lands:

Liberating the Muslim nation, confronting the enemies of Islam, and launching jihad against them require a Muslim authority, established on a Muslim land, that raises the banner of jihad and rallies the Muslims around it. Without achieving this goal our actions will mean nothing more than mere and repeated disturbances that will not lead to the aspired goal, which is the restoration of the caliphate and the dismissal of the invaders from the land of Islam. Ibid.  p. 225.

The Sharia was given to the Muslims by God, and the umma “will not accept any other law, after it has suffered from the anti-Islamic trends forcefully imposed on it.” Ibid.  p. 247.  Sharia can not be implemented when Muslim countries remain occupied. When the occupation has been removed, the Islamic countries should enjoy full sovereignty. This change can come (as we have seen earlier) through armed struggle for the sake of God. An addition, along with jihad there must also be room for invitation to Islam, dawah. Ibid.  p. 322.      
   
In sum, al-Zawahiri’s interpretation of jāhilīyyah is consistent with Qutb’s interpretation. Al-Zawahiri (and likewise bin Ladin) considers obedience as a form of worship, which entails departure from tawhid into shirk. He also advocates the Sharia as the only source for legislation in his monotheocratic society. They do part concerning how far they want to extend the struggle against jāhilīyyah. Qutb on a global scale, and al-Zawahiri being more focused on the Middle East and the Muslim world.
     

Perception of jihād

In Bitter Harvest al-Zawahiri criticised the Muslim Brethren and its call for reformation instead of revolution. Al-Zawahiri critiqued the Muslim Brethren in his pamphlet Bitter Harvest (1991). In the same vain as Qutb, al-Zawahiri argues that the so-called Muslim regimes of the Middle East, are not following Islam, and are thus infidel and apostate regimes. Islamists must ask themselves whether in fact these regimes are Muslim:

 The Islamic movements must answer the questions: are the governments in the Muslim countries true Muslims or are they kufr (infidels)? These rulers are obviously kufr and murtaddeen (apostates) because they rule with a law other than that of Allah. Therefore it is a fard ayn [i.e. an individual duty] to wage jihad against them and remove them from their positions. It is not allowed to rule with a law other than that of Allah, as these rulers do. By imposing their own rules instead of God’s they are in fact ridiculing shari’ah laws. Cragin (2008) p. 1054 [italics added]

Al-Zawahiri, like bin Ladin, regard jihād as a means of defending Islam, the Muslim sanctities, values and wealth. This battle affects every Muslim and is not limited to any particular region: Mansfield (2006) p. 223.  

The struggle for the Muslim state cannot be considered a regional struggle, certainly not after it had been ascertained that the Crusader alliance led by the United States will not allow any Muslim force to reach power in the Arab countries. Ibid.  p. 201.

For the Islamic fundamentalist movement to be victorious over the Western hegemony in the Muslim world it must have “an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region.” Ibid.  p. 201. al-Zawahiri describes the jihad movement as fundamentalist.  Essentially, the idea (as pointed out earlier) is to restore the once so great caliphate, which would enable them to fend off their antagonists, because then they would have a country to launch their operations from, as stated in Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. There is no solution without jihād, in bringing about political change. Ibid.  p. 205. The jihadist movements should not participate in democratic elections, because it is doomed to fail. For example, al-Zawahiri argued that the Algerian Islamic Salvations Front (FIS), had fallen into this trap:  
   
 [The Algerian experience] proved to Muslims that the west is not only an infidel but also a hypocrite and a liar. The principles [democratic] that it brags about are exclusive to, and personal property of, its people alone. They are not to be shared by the peoples of Islam […]. [The FIS] men thought that the gates of rule had been opened for them, but they were surprised to see themselves pushed toward the gates of detention camps and prisons and into the cells of the new world order [i.e the Jewish Crusade alliance].  Ibid.  p. 205-206.        

The Islamic Salvations Front had ‘gone democratic’ and actually won nearly half of the votes in the 1993 election. Noorani (2002) p. 6-7. Because no party had gain more than 50 per cent of the votes, a second round was expected, but were never held. Instead the Islamic Salvations Front was banned. This as an example of why democracy as a means to an end, for the Islamic movement, is false. The Algerian military had stepped in to hinder the Islamic Salvation Front from taking power through a democratically held election, because they feared that they would not remain faithful to the democratic system once they were elected in the second round. The members of the group became imprisoned. The lesson, according to al-Zawahiri, is that secularist democracy and its proponents can not be trusted, and as said earlier al-Zawahiri seem convinced that the Crusader Alliance would not allow for any Muslim party take power in any country in the Arab region (e.g. Hamas in Palestine). For al-Zawahiri it is paramount for the jihadists “not to trust the secularists who have sold Palestine cheaply, and not to be drawn into the secular game of elections in accordance with a secular constitution.” : Mansfield (2006) p. 248-9, and 300, for Hamas see: p. 317. The conclusion therefore is that there are no means of reaching power other than jihād. When would the effort of jihād end? Echoing Usama bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri said in a message addressed to ‘the people of the West’ that “[i]f you […] think that these cardboard governments can protect you, you are wrong. Real security is based on mutual cooperation with the Islamic nation on the basis of mutual respect and the stopping of aggression.” Mansfield (2006) p. 245. Like in the case of bin Ladin, this is crucial to their case for a defensive jihād. This thought can also be observed in al-Zawahiri’s view that neither the mujahadīn nor al-Qaida would rule Iraq after ousting the occupying forces:

 [I]t doesn’t appear that the Mujahedeen, much less the al-Qaida in the Land of Two Rivers [i.e. Iraq], will lay claim to governance without the Iraqi people. Not to mention that that would be in contravention of the Shura methodology. That is not practical in my opinion. Ibid.  p. 260-61.

Instead, it seems as if these insurgents would not engage in governmental activities per se, but as Qutb said, to ‘clear the way for striving through preaching’. Accordingly, liberated lands would be governed primarily by their inhabitants, in association with others. The Taliban regime is an example of what might happen if the population is excluded from the political process. Ibid.  p. 262.

Al-Zawahiri’s perception of jihād is that is a defensive endeavour to free Muslim lands and ultimately to reinstall Islamic law. This notion departs form Qutb, for the latter argues that jihād is an offensive struggle against world jāhilīyyah.











References:

Books  Books that do not have any printing location are e-books.
Abdo, Geneive (2002) No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam. OUP.
Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Mansouri, Fethi (2007) Islam and Political Violence. Tauris Academic Studies.
Azzam, Sheik Abdullah, Join the Caravan, English translation in pdf.
Cook, David (2005) Understanding Jihad. University of California Press.
Cooper, Barry (2004) New Political Religions, or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism. University of Missouri Press.
Davis, Joyce M. (2003) Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan
Esposito, John L. (2003) Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. NY, OUP.
Esposito, John L. (2005) Islam. The Straight Path. NY, OUP, 3^rd ed.
Euben, Roxanne L. (1999) Enemy in the Mirror. Princeton University Press.
Gold, Dore (2003) Hatred’s Kingdom. How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism. D.C., Regnery Publishing, Inc.
Habeck, Mary (2006) Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror. Yale, Yale University Press.
Hamdi, Hassan A. (2004), Al-Qaeda: The Background of the Pursuit for Global Jihad, Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksell International.
Ibrahim, Raymond (2007) The Al Qaeda Reader. NY, Broadway Books.
Kenney, Jeffrey T. (2006) Muslim Rebels: Kharijite Rhetoric and the Politics of Extremism in Modern Egypt. Oxford University Press.
Kepel, Gilles (2004) The War for Muslim Minds. Islam and the West. Cambridge, The Belknap Press of HUP.
Kepel, Gilles (1984/2003) Muslim Extremism in Egypt. The Prophet and the Pharaoh. California, UCP.
Lapidus, Ira M. (2002) A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge, CUP, 2^nd ed.
Lawrence, Bruce [ed.] (2005) Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden. NY, Verso.
Mansfield, Laura (2006) His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri. USA, Lulu, TLG Publications. (Includes Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner)
Ménoret, Pascal (2005) The Saudi Enigma. A History. London, Zed Books.
Noorani, A. G. (2002) Islam & Jihad. Prejudice versus Reality. London, Zed Books Ltd.
Pape, Robert A. (2006) Dying To Win. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. NY, Random House Trade Paperbacks.
Qutb, Sayyid (2001) Milestones. New Delhi, Islamic Book Service.
Qutb, Sayyid (1973) Signposts Along the Way. Beirut/ Cairo, Dar al-Shurūq.
Arabic: سيد قطب (١٩٧٣)"معالم فى الطريق"..بيروت،القاهرة ..طبعة : دار الشروق
Can be downloaded in pdf [http://www.mediafire.com/?tkh4wjcqzli]
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2002), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, D.C., Brassey’s, first edition.
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2004), Imperial Hubris- Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror, Dulles, Virginia, Brassey’s, first edition.
Timmerman, Kenneth R. (2004) Preachers of Hate. Islam and the War on America, NY, Three Rivers Press.
Wehr, Hans (1994) The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. 4^th ed.
Wright, Lawrence (2007), The Looming Tower- Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New York, Vintage Books.
Al-Zawahiri, Ayman (2001) Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. (Originally published on a website منبر التوحيد والجهاد / minbar al-tawhid wa al-jihad, English: “pulpit of monotheism and jihad”  
Zeidan, David (2003) Resurgence of Religion: A Comparative Study of Selected Themes in Christian and Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses. Brill, N.H.E.J., N.V. Koninklijke,  Boekhandel en Drukkerij

Articles

Cragin, Kim R, (2008) “Early History of Al-Qa’ida”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, No. 4.

Evans, Alexander (2007) “The Man and the Message: The World According To Bin Laden”, Asian Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. II, Routledge.

Gwynne, Rosalind W. (2006)”Usama bin Ladin, the Qur’an and Jihad”, Religion, Vol. 36.

Hansen, Hendrik & Kainz, Peter (2007) “Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: a Comparison of Sayyid Qutb’s Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 8, No. 1.

Shepard, William (1997) “The Myth of Progress in the Writings of Sayyid Qutb”, Religion, Vol. 27.

Jahiliyyah and Jihad - Qutb's influence on bin Laden and al-Zawahiri (part 4)

Usama bin Ladin


As mentioned in the introduction, Usama bin Ladin’s university lector was Qutb’s brother, Muhammad Qutb. In addition, bin Ladin’s close relationship with Ayman al-Zawahiri who is very influenced by Qutb, leads one to think that Qutb’s thoughts must have been passed on to bin Ladin. So the inference made by many, is that bin Ladin (and al-Qaida) is influenced by Qutb, and this link has almost been an indispensable part of the general narrative. One could argue that this link is a construction rather than an exact description of reality. Fore instance, bin Ladin does not mention Sayyid Qutb in any of his statements, while recommending a book by Muhammad Qutb. Lawrence (2004) p. 229. Bin Ladin mentions different books and among them M. Qutb’s Concepts that Should be Corrected.  What makes this strange is that while evoking authors of traditions, for example Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, bin Ladin also cites ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Taymiyya did not produce any tafsir (Qur’an commentaries) but since his works are filled with material from the Qur’an, attempts have been made to compile a tafsir:  Gwynne (2006) p. 63.  ibn al-Qayyim, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, al-Qurtubi, which have collected traditions, and written commentaries on the Quran, like Qutb. So if bin Ladin were some how intellectually indebted to Qutb, why not cite him? As we will see, Qutb’s interpretation of jihād is not held by bin Ladin, and this might be a possible reason for him not mentioning Qutb. Despite this fact, it will be shown that bin Ladin share some of Qutb interpretations on jāhilīyyah.


Perception of jāhilīyyah and the Ideal Society

In a video message to the Iraqi people in October of 2003, bin Ladin urged the Iraqis not to support the occupation by the United States. In this message bin Ladin denounce democracy as a religion of ignorance; “Islam is the religion of God, and the legislative councils of representatives are the religion of ignorance [i.e. jāhilīyyah].”  Lawrence (2004) p. 208. He also stressed the importance of not supporting solutions or roadmaps for peace which involve apostate regimes or the Jews and Crusaders, for peace with these would be an “errant idea which contravenes God’s law and stands in the way of fighting for him.” Ibid.  p. 208. According to bin Ladin (likewise Qutb and al-Zawahiri), all laws emanate from God. On the opposite side of tawhīd is shirk (polytheism). Now, tawhīd (essentially monotheism) is the essence of the first pillar of Islam (shahāda). As mentioned earlier, to obey a law, means per definition to obey and to worship its makers. So for bin Ladin, the thought of having a legislative branch as per democratic systems is unthinkable because it contradicts the very essence of tawhīd, and thus constitutes shirk. Democracy, because it is based on human desires, also endorses specific behaviours like desire, same-sex marriage or partnership, gender equality, freedom of speech, secularism, usury, corruption etc.  Bin Ladin’s ideal society is one that is ruled according to the will of God, by way of the sharia laws. The democratic and secular system known throughout the West, is not his cup of the. If the Islamic movement would take over the Arabian Peninsula, the countries would be run as per the revelation of the Prophet Muhammad and the will of God. Ibid. p. 45. In addition, bin Ladin also seeks to restore the caliphate and to make the umma the victor over falsehood and inequality in the Arab countries:

 [O]ur concern is that our umma unites either under the Words of the Book of God or his Prophet […], and that this nation should establish the righteous caliphate [kilāfah al-rāshid-ān] which has been prophesised by our Prophet in his authentic hadith. Ibid.  p. 121.          

The righteous or pious caliphates refer to the four successors of the Prophet Muhammad. They are regarded as righteous because they were fulfilling the deeds of the Prophet, thus their reign was based on a religious authority. After the death of Ali, who was the last of the four, Islam was divided and there have been many different caliphates since then, none of which were religiously rooted, but rather based on power politics. In other words, “the spirit of Islamic democracy was buried in the coffin of Ali […].” Noorani (2002) p. 79.

In short, there are similarities between bin Ladin and Qutb. Both describe democracy and its features as a religion of jāhilīyyah. They also share the notion that obedience is worshipping, and thereby making obedience of man-made laws an act of great sin, shirk. Bin Ladin’s idea of an ideal society also seems to be in accord with that of Qutb. One difference is that bin Ladin explicitly advocates the forming of a caliphate, while the word caliphate does not occur in Milestones. However, Qutb do argue that if Islam was to lead the world, it would have to base its societal structure on the first umma.  
 

Perception of jihād

For Usama bin Ladin, jihād is an indispensable part of Islamic religiosity. It could be viewed as a sixth pillar of Islam, and is seen as a religious responsibility:

I say it jihad is without doubt mandatory for all Muslims, to free al-Aqsa, or to save the weak in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and all Islamic lands; there is no doubt that freeing the Arabian peninsula from the polytheists [al-mushrakīn] is also compulsory. Lawrence (2004) p. 115.

The jihad has become an obligation upon each and every Muslim. We advise the Muslim youth not to fall victim to the words of some ulema who are misleading the umma by stating that jihad is still a communal duty [as in an Offensive jihad]. Ibrahim (2007) p. 268.  [bracket by Ibrahim]

The above citation and especially the latter part of it, i.e. the mentioning of an offensive jihād, calls for an explanation. The defensive jihad is an individual duty according to bin Ladin, while the offensive jihad is a communal duty. A common notion is that the offensive jihād cannot commanded by anyone but the Caliph, which is a non-existent position. The Caliph could, much like any other head of state, take its nation to war and would therefore have the authority to issue a draft which would make it a communal duty to serve. For this reason, jihād to conquer new lands for Islam could not legitimately take place as long as there is no caliph who could authorize it. But as Esposito points out, the interpretation of jihād as offensive came from the time of early Islam when the umma was sponsored financially by the caliphate, which made it dependent of the latter. The caliphate needed religious legitimacy to enable it to expand. It is in this context one should understand the development of the notion or the dogma of offensive jihād. Esposito (2003) p. 35.  Bin Ladin calls for jihād in defence of Islam and the umma, which he argues to be mandatory for all Muslims. This form does not need an authorization as the one above. The notion of al-Qaida’s war as defensive jihād has been challenged though.  For example, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Muhammad Said Tantawy: Lawrence (2004) p. 141. For bin Ladin, jihād in the context of pre- and post-9/11 is defensive in nature. Whether this means that he does not acknowledge the notion of offensive jihād, is hard to say. In examining his rhetoric we find that jihād is almost exclusively being used in a defensive sense. There is one text, though, that speaks of Islam as an offensive religion and of jihād as a tool to enforce Islam on people. Although very interesting, this essay does not take this text into consideration due to the uncertainty about its authorship.  The text, “Moderate Islam is a Prostration to the West”, is purportedly written or authorized by bin Ladin. It argues for example that “They say that our sharia does not impose our particular belief upon others; this is a false assertion. For it is, in fact, part of our religion to impose our particular beliefs upon others.” Ibrahim (2007) p.51.  Regarding the defensive message of bin Ladin and possible reasons for its perseverance; one take is that he needs to formulate an argument so that it coincides with the thoughts of the ulema and Islamic law. Some argue that the formulation of a defensive jihād and that it is being provoked by attacks on Islam, gives proof of his genius. Scheuer (2004) p. 7. Another interpretation is that his proclamation of a defensive jihād is genuine and honest; he feels as if his religion, society and fellow Muslims, and the Islamic way of life are being attacked. Thus, his call for jihād could be interpreted as nothing more than a respond to this attack. The defensive message was quite harshly delivered in the World Islamic Front’s declaration of war against the Jews and the Crusaders, 1998:

To kill the American[s] and there allies - civilians and military – is an individual duty incumbent upon every Muslim […] in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque [i.e. al-Haram in Mecca] so that their armies leave all territory of Islam […] unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of God Almighty: ‘Fight the idolaters at any time, if they first fight you […] until there is no more persecution […]. Lawrence (2004) p. 61.

In an interview with the Pakistani Daily, on November 7 2001, bin Ladin stated that the fight against the USA is defensive in nature:  

We ourselves [the Muslims] are the victims of murder and massacres. We are only defending ourselves against the United States. This is a defensive jihad to protect our land and people. That’s why I have said that if we don’t have security, neither will the Americans. It’s a very simple equation […]. Ibid.  p. 141. [italics added]

The earlier messages of bin Ladin focused on Saudi Arabia its policies towards the Middle East, and their alliance with the United States. By letting US forces use Saudi soil to launch its war against Iraq in the first Gulf War, they had stained the holy sanctities of Islam. In addition, the regime had stolen the income of the people to spend it on its joys. This amongst other things, led bin Ladin to openly declare war on America and on the Saudi regime for suspending the sharia and replacing it with man-made laws; and for being unable to protect the land, and thus depending on “the American Crusaders, who have become the principal  reason for all aspects of our land’s disastrous predicament.” Ibid.  p. 28. To further grasp bin Ladin’s conception of jihād, it is also vital to know under which circumstances it might end:

The cause of the reaction must be sought and the act that triggered this reaction must be eliminated. The reaction came as a result of the aggressive US policy towards the entire Muslim world […]. So if the cause that has called for this act comes to an end, this act, in turn, will come to an end. So, the defensive jihad against the US does not stop with its withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula; rather, it must desist from aggressive intervention against Muslims throughout the whole world. Ibid.  p. 47-48. [italics added]

The struggle would end it is said, with the ending of foreign intervention in the Muslim world. This is essential because his call for defensive jihād would not else have worked, logically.  Bin Ladin has also stated that the perpetrators of the attacks on Washington and New York, had committed the acts in “self-defense, [in] defence of our brothers and sons in Palestine, and in order to free our holy sanctuaries”. Further more he seems to be arguing against describing these acts as terrorism; “And if inciting for these reasons is terrorism, and if killing those that kill our sons is terrorism, then let history witness that we are terrorists.” Ibid.  p. 107. Both citations.  In other words, al-Qaida are not terrorists in the original sense, but rather more like insurgents. In February 2003 (a month prior to the invasion of Iraq) an audiotape was aired by al-Jazeera. In it bin Ladin urged the people of Iraq to engage in a defensive jihād against the forthcoming invaders. Ibid.  p. 181.  

All these American crimes and sins are a clear proclamation of war against God, his Messenger, and the Muslims. Religious scholars throughout Islamic history have agreed that jihad is an individual duty when an enemy attacks Muslim countries. […] ‘After faith, there is no greater duty than fighting an enemy who is corrupting religion and the world’.  Ibid.  p. 60-61. [italics added]

Defending Islam and Muslims is only obligatory if it is possible to do. In an interview with al-Jazeera December 1998, bin Ladin explained that jihād should be carried out if the necessary conditions exists, but, “[h]owever, in some countries it might have been shown to some people that the necessary conditions are in place, but after a while they gain experience [and] realise that this is in fact not the case; in this instance they are charged with pardon and forgiveness.” Ibid.  p. 79. There are also other sides of jihād as per bin Ladin. He quotes the hadith
Of Sahih Muslim, which says: “Whoever fights them [the infidels] with his hand is a believer, whoever does so with his tongue is a believer, whoever does so with his heart is a believer”. Ibid.  p. 202.   Thus, fighting is not the only way of pursuing jihād. The ones who are unable to fight, must wage jihād through speaking or by finance. The one’s who cannot speak or who do not have any money to spare should perform jihād with their hearts. Bin Ladin argues that the mujāhid should perform jihād “both with his hand and tongue, although this is only the weakest part of faith.” Ibid.  p. 202.  It is not clear what bin Ladin is referring to here. This could be a reference to the notion of the greater and lesser jihād. Bin Ladin quotes ibn Taymiyya saying “there is no greater duty after faith than uncompromising struggle [i.e. jihād] against [the enemy of Islam].” Ibid.  p. 202. This seems to indicate that faith is ascribed a higher value than physical jihād.
To summarize, jihād as per bin Ladin departs from Qutb’s interpretation of the same. Bin Ladin uses jihād in a defensive sense, which stands in contrast with Qutb’s argument which says that jihād is only offensive.              
 
References:

Books  Books that do not have any printing location are e-books.
Abdo, Geneive (2002) No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam. OUP.
Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Mansouri, Fethi (2007) Islam and Political Violence. Tauris Academic Studies.
Azzam, Sheik Abdullah, Join the Caravan, English translation in pdf.
Cook, David (2005) Understanding Jihad. University of California Press.
Cooper, Barry (2004) New Political Religions, or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism. University of Missouri Press.
Davis, Joyce M. (2003) Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan
Esposito, John L. (2003) Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. NY, OUP.
Esposito, John L. (2005) Islam. The Straight Path. NY, OUP, 3^rd ed.
Euben, Roxanne L. (1999) Enemy in the Mirror. Princeton University Press.
Gold, Dore (2003) Hatred’s Kingdom. How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism. D.C., Regnery Publishing, Inc.
Habeck, Mary (2006) Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror. Yale, Yale University Press.
Hamdi, Hassan A. (2004), Al-Qaeda: The Background of the Pursuit for Global Jihad, Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksell International.
Ibrahim, Raymond (2007) The Al Qaeda Reader. NY, Broadway Books.
Kenney, Jeffrey T. (2006) Muslim Rebels: Kharijite Rhetoric and the Politics of Extremism in Modern Egypt. Oxford University Press.
Kepel, Gilles (2004) The War for Muslim Minds. Islam and the West. Cambridge, The Belknap Press of HUP.
Kepel, Gilles (1984/2003) Muslim Extremism in Egypt. The Prophet and the Pharaoh. California, UCP.
Lapidus, Ira M. (2002) A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge, CUP, 2^nd ed.
Lawrence, Bruce [ed.] (2005) Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden. NY, Verso.
Mansfield, Laura (2006) His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri. USA, Lulu, TLG Publications. (Includes Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner)
Ménoret, Pascal (2005) The Saudi Enigma. A History. London, Zed Books.
Noorani, A. G. (2002) Islam & Jihad. Prejudice versus Reality. London, Zed Books Ltd.
Pape, Robert A. (2006) Dying To Win. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. NY, Random House Trade Paperbacks.
Qutb, Sayyid (2001) Milestones. New Delhi, Islamic Book Service.
Qutb, Sayyid (1973) Signposts Along the Way. Beirut/ Cairo, Dar al-Shurūq.
Arabic: سيد قطب (١٩٧٣)"معالم فى الطريق"..بيروت،القاهرة ..طبعة : دار الشروق
Can be downloaded in pdf [http://www.mediafire.com/?tkh4wjcqzli]
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2002), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, D.C., Brassey’s, first edition.
Scheuer, Michael (published anonymously) (2004), Imperial Hubris- Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror, Dulles, Virginia, Brassey’s, first edition.
Timmerman, Kenneth R. (2004) Preachers of Hate. Islam and the War on America, NY, Three Rivers Press.
Wehr, Hans (1994) The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. 4^th ed.
Wright, Lawrence (2007), The Looming Tower- Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New York, Vintage Books.
Al-Zawahiri, Ayman (2001) Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. (Originally published on a website منبر التوحيد والجهاد / minbar al-tawhid wa al-jihad, English: “pulpit of monotheism and jihad”.
Zeidan, David (2003) Resurgence of Religion: A Comparative Study of Selected Themes in Christian and Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses. Brill, N.H.E.J., N.V. Koninklijke,  Boekhandel en Drukkerij

Articles

Cragin, Kim R, (2008) “Early History of Al-Qa’ida”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, No. 4.

Evans, Alexander (2007) “The Man and the Message: The World According To Bin Laden”, Asian Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. II, Routledge.

Gwynne, Rosalind W. (2006)”Usama bin Ladin, the Qur’an and Jihad”, Religion, Vol. 36.

Hansen, Hendrik & Kainz, Peter (2007) “Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: a Comparison of Sayyid Qutb’s Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 8, No. 1.

Shepard, William (1997) “The Myth of Progress in the Writings of Sayyid Qutb”, Religion, Vol. 27.